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Chapter 1
 
HISTORY OF CALIFORNIA WELFARE POLICIES
 
Introduction
 
The purpose of this paper is to present an overview of the history
 
of California welfare policies and to examine county-funded general re
 
lief policies across the 58 counties in California and across time.
 
An extensive search of the literature was conducted through the
 
University of California library system and national reference libraries.
 
A history of California welfare policies after 1935. has not been writ
 
ten. Only one article presents a history of the 1957 California legis
 
lature and its welfare reforms.^ The bibliography reflects the available
 
literature on this subject.
 
The only available data on all counties' general relief policies
 
was a 1981 state survey conducted by the California Department of Social
 
Services. This survey concerned only maximum benefits available on a
 
county-by-county basis. Because general relief programs are county—
 
1. tenBroek, Jacobus, "Welfare in the 1957 Legislature," Califor
 
nia Law Review 46 (August 1958), pp. 331-375.
 
funded, very little data is maintained at the state level.^ This author
 
became interested in the wide variations of county general relief programs
 
through various discussions with Candy Nobel and Ginger Simpson of the
 
Statistical Services Branch of the California State Department of Social
 
Services during December 1982. It was apparent that no one had conducted
 
an extensive study of general relief programs. For this reason, the
 
survey shown in Appendices A and B was conducted at the beginning of this
 
study (done in December 1982 and January 1983).
 
Furthermore, it appeared that policies of welfare were cyclical and
 
that certain variables had some influence on general relief policies.
 
These variables are presented in Chapters 2 and 3 as well as development
 
and outcomes of presented hypotheses.
 
PREMISES OF THE POOR LAWS
 
Although most of the current debate on welfare dates back to the
 
New Deal in the 1930's, welfare in the United States is not a recent
 
development. The origins of current American welfare policy go back to
 
the colonial era. The English Poor Laws of the sixteenth and seventeenth
 
2. These programs receive neither state or federal funding. The
 
state only required counties to report statistical data concerning "Home
 
Relief Recipients and Expenditures by Type and Case," "Total General
 
Relief Expenditures by Type," "General Home Relief Total Persons Aided,"
 
"Expenditures and Percent Change," and "Miscellaneous General Relief
 
Cases, Persons and Expenditures," on a monthly basis in Public Welfare
 
In California PA-3 until July 1982. After that time (the beginning of a
 
new fiscal year) the reported data was changed. For this reason, this
 
author is concerned with fiscal years in the cross-sectional study.
 
centuries influenced the colonial leaders who drew heavily upon them when
 
formulating the American approach. Therefore, in order to understand
 
welfare philosophy in,the, United States, a closer study of the English
 
Poor Laws is necessary.^
 
Before the Poor Laws were enacted, economic conditions produced a
 
rise in poverty in England. However, many felt it was laziness that
 
caused poverty and that the poor should be punished because they were
 
poor.^ Even in the fourteenth century it had been a crime to give alms
 
to "those which may labor." After that time period only those who were
 
"impotent" (disabled) were allowed to beg.^ The distinction between the
 
"impotent" and the able-bodied poor became the centerpiece for the Poor
 
Laws and, indeed, for most subsequent welfare legislation.
 
Local Public Responsibility For The Poor
 
The Poor Laws* enactment was the first time that local governmental
 
responsibility for the poor was established.^ Prior to this, churches
 
and charitable organizations had cared for the poor. The church's poverty
 
jurisdiction was similar to that for marriage and divorce.^ Also, beg­
3. deSchweintz, Karl, England's Road to Social Security (Phila
 
delphia, Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1943), p. 59.
 
4. lbid.
 
5. Ibid.
 
6. 43 Elizabeth 1, chapter 2, (1601).
 
7. tenBroek, Jacobus, Family Law and the Poor (Westport, Connec
 
ticut: Greenwood Publishing Company, 1971), p. 12.
 
ging was an established and reputable practice. The government respon
 
sibility assumed by the Poor Laws was not intended to eliminate these
 
other sources of aid. They were designed to supplement charitable programs
 
administered by others and to give local government authorities the right
 
to attend to the poor. However, all of these other sources of aid were to
 
be funneled through the local governments.
 
The Deserving and Non-deserving Poor
 
Because local governments were now responsible for the poor, they
 
alone decided who should receive aid and who should not. Relief was given
 
without reservation to the "lame, impotent, old and the blind."® These
 
were the deserving poor. The non-deserving poor were those classified
 
as vagrants and the able-bodied unemployed.
 
The vagrant was put to work and the money from his labors was used to
 
pay the balance of his debt or to support his wife and children.^ Vagrants
 
who refused to work could be removed to houses of correction, whipped,
 
branded, stoned, or put to death. Those considered paupers (the able-

bodied and unemployed poor) were punished by being placed in workhouses.
 
8. 43 Elizabeth 1, chapter 2, (1601),
 
9. Ibid.
 
10. Trattner, Walter I., From Poor Law to Welfare State 2nd ed.
 
(New York: The Free Press, 1978), p. 8.
 
OTHER REQUIREMENTS OF THE POOR LAWS
 
Workhouses
 
Implicit in the Poor Laws was the condition that the able-bodied
 
but poverty-stricken person must work for the charity he or she received.
 
Parish workhouses were set up to this end. The overseers of the poor were
 
to set to work "all such persons, married or unmarried, having no means
 
to maintain themselves, and use no ordinary and daily trade of life to
 
get their living by." At these workhouses the parishes were to raise....
 
(by taxation)...a convenient stock of flax, hemp, wool, thread, iron and
 
other necessary ware and stuff, to set the poor to work.^^ The belief of
 
the English Parliament was that the poor could be reformed by removing
 
them from the environments which had presumably led them astray.
 
Residency Requirements
 
In order to receive aid the pauper had to have established settle
 
ment in the community. Strangers were to be forcibly removed if they
 
were destitute or likely to become so.^^ Economic security was very im
 
portant then as it is now.^^ This was a time of severe food shortages,
 
11. 43 Elizabeth 1, chapter 2, (1601).
 
12. Ibid.
 
13. 43 Elizabeth 1, chapter 2, (1601).
 
14. Ibid.
 
15. deSchweintz, England*s Road, p. 62,
 
widespread famine, and escalating prices. The stranger at the door was
 
perceived to be a threat and there simply was no aid available for him.^^
 
Responsibility of Relatives
 
Parents, insofar as their means would allow, were legally liable
 
for the support of their children and grandchildren. Likewise, children
 
were responsible for their needy parents and grandparents. Those who
 
could afford to were charged by local officials to discharge their duty
 
"in that manner and according to the rate fixed.
 
TENETS OF CALIFORNIA WELFARE
 
The above tenets of the Poor Laws have been passed down from gen
 
eration to generation. Though most of these laws (e.g., the death penalty
 
for vagrancy) have been modified over time, this type of welfare law
 
exists in California today. General relief policies across all coun
 
ties have many of the same characteristics. However, welfare policy under
 
Spain before statehood was considerably different.
 
16. Ibid.
 
17. Ibid.
 
18. 43 Elizabeth 1, chapter 2, (1601).
 
19. tenBroek, Jacobus, "California's Welfare Law - Origins and
 
Development," California Law Review 45 (July 1957), p. 270. See also
 
California Welfare Handbook of 1982 published by the California State
 
Department of Social Services.
 
SPANISH WELFARE POLICY^O
 
In the early days, the Spanish priests established missions for
 
the care and instruction of Indians living in California. California was
 
an outpost on the periphery of the Spanish empire. Theoretically, it was
 
under the absolute power of Spain. In actuality, California was left to
 
its own devices and a system of welfare evolved through the missions.
 
A thin line of missions (21) stretched up the coast of California.
 
This system of missions maintained maximum control over the Indians,
 
providing work for them and "civilizing" them. The missions were thus
 
an integral part of Spanish policy. They were not only religious but mili
 
tary, political, economic, and social centers.
 
The Spanish colonial policy held that the Indian should be inte
 
grated into their society. The objective of this was consistent with the
 
Catholic conception of the Indian as one who, though barbarous, uncon
 
verted, and degraded, was yet a person with an immortal soul to be saved.
 
Once recognized as such, the Indian was therefore accepted. Another
 
reason for Spanish acceptance was the lack of sufficient number of Span
 
iards to settle California. In lieu of Spaniards, the Indians would have
 
to do.
 
20. Information presented in this section is based on the research
 
of Jacobus tenBroek in his article "California Welfare Law - Origins and
 
Development," California Law Review (July 1957), pp. 241-303.
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The mission was intended to be a temporary answer to colonization
 
of the land. When the taming of the Indians was completed, the priests
 
were to move on to other frontiers. The missions were to become pueblos
 
and the land divided among the Indians, thus guaranteeing their welfare.
 
Despite the apparent concern for the Indians' souls, this system
 
of welfare was very punitive. The Indians were captured and forced to
 
learn hygiene and civilized ways. They were not allowed to leave the
 
missions and if they escaped they were severely punished when they were
 
recaptured.
 
The laws of Mexico (and Spain) continued to influence California
 
until 1822, long after the secularization of the missions and the begin
 
ning of the influx of settlers from the United States. Although, the
 
welfare system based on communal labor died with the missions in the
 
1830's, there were many general provisions dealing with welfare subjects.
 
Often, Spanish (and frequently, pueblo) law gave its blessing and finan
 
cial support to charitable establishments of both public and private
 
origin. These institutions dealt with the problems of dependent and
 
deliquent children, of the sick, and of vagrancy. However, the problems
 
of the aged, disabled or simply poverty-stricken received less attention.
 
Overjall 5 Mexican (and Spanish) policy showed no consistent pat
 
tern. This changed with the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1846. The
 
treaty ceded the territory of California to the United States. Welfare
 
policy began to change significantly with statehood in 1849.
 
1849 THROUGH 1929
 
the arrival of settlers from the United States profoundly altered
 
the demographics of California. From gold-rush days to the present the
 
dominant part of the population has consisted of white Europeans. There
 
fore, Anglo-American tradition of welfare policy soon replaced the poli
 
cies of Spain. The welfare provisions now existing in the state come
 
from the Poor Laws. The restrictiveness of these laws passed to the state
 
of California. The principles of local governmental responsibility, con
 
ditions of eligibility, relief for the poor who were unable to work and
 
reimbursement by a wealthier relation were all adopted.22 As in the Poor
 
Laws, these restrictions generally excluded the able-bodied poor.23
 
The state constitution of 1849 and its revision in 1879 both allowed
 
for the care of the indigent sick but not of the employable poor.2^ in
 
1852 county boards of supervisors were given the right by the state to
 
care for various needy persons as they saw fit. In general, the boards
 
relied on the state's restrictive classifications. For example, in Placer
 
county poor persons were separated into socially respectable and unrespec­
table, and those who were indigent before or after illness.25 gan Mateo
 
21. In 1850 "More than twenty-nine thirtieths of the immigrants
 
in the state came from that part of the union where the common law (English)
 
was recognized." These men were therefore acquainted with common law.
 
The majority of California judges knew very little about civil law or the
 
law of Spain but practiced the common law of England. Jack Goodwin, The
 
Establishment of State Government In California (Berkeley, California:
 
University of California Press, 1914), pp. 285-286.
 
22. California Welfare Handbook, Op. Cit.
 
23. Ibid.
 
24. Cal. Stat. 1852, c. XXXVII, p. 87, s. 7.
 
25. Placer County, 1852, c. CCXI, p. 243.
 
10 
county in 1866 was unique in its policy toward indigents. They provided
 
for the care of all the indigent - not only the sick.^^ In the rest of
 
the state during the IBSOVs, however, welfare for the indigent was at low
 
levels. Labor was in constant demand in California. But with the com
 
pletion of the Central Pacific Railway in 1869, the demand for laborers
 
decreased. Industry and agriculture were unable to absorb all those who
 
were unemployed and the need for welfare grew.^^
 
Thus, beginning in 1870, the problem of caring for the unemployed
 
became a serious problem for local communities. Various benevolent
 
societies began in cities and towns from Grass Valley to San Diego. These
 
societies aided the unemployed until the adoption of the 1879 constitu
 
tion prohibited such societies.^® These societies were considered secret
 
societies and against the new constitution.
 
During the 1880*s many of the unemployed came to San Francisco to
 
seek work. The city was overwhelmed with requests for aid and churches
 
fed more than 2,000 men daily during the most severe period of unemploy
 
ment. Even so, there was considerable discrimination at this time and
 
only whites were aided. In fact, many measures were passed which speci­
26. San Mateo County, 1866, c. CCVI, p. 339, s. 15.
 
27. Cahn, Frances and Valeska Barry, Welfare Activities of Fed
 
eral, State and Local Governments in California 1850-1934, (Berkeley,
 
California: University of California Press, 1936), p. 198.
 
28. Constitution of California, 1879, Art. IV, Sec. 22.
 
29. Cahn, Welfare Activities, p. 199.
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fically excluded the immigrant Chinese and the native Indian.
 
Empla3nnent returned to a higher level during the late 1880*s, but
 
in 1893 a financial panic brought about another depression. The result
 
was mass unemployment and a demand for welfare services for the unem
 
ployed. Again, the city of San Francisco provided relief for many by
 
contributing $3,000 per month to various charities and churches who aided
 
the able-bodied poor.^^ Even the police gave free meals and lodging (in
 
the jails) to all who applied.
 
Many were so desperate that they joined roving bands who sought work
 
in towns across the state. In 1894, these bands of men joined with
 
those in other states. They marched to Washington, D.C., demanding
 
federal aid.^^ Congress did consider the federal welfare issue but in
 
the end no aid was made available. This was considered a local issue and
 
not a federal concern.
 
30. Coolridge, Mary Roberts, Chinese Immigration, (Berkeley,
 
California: University of California Press, 1909), p. 37.
 
31. Cahn, Welfare Activities 1850 - 1934, p. 203.
 
32. Ibid.
 
33. McMurray, Donald L., Cozey's Army, (Berkeley, California:
 
University of California Press, 1929), p. 127.
 
34. lbid.
 
35. Ibid.
 
36. Ibid.
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The persistent problems of poverty and unemployment increased the
 
pressure toward centralized welfare policy. Finally, in 1903, the State
 
Board of Charities and Corrections was initiated. This Board assumed
 
responsibility for all welfare except county general relief. Despite the
 
centralization, the structure of welfare policy changed little. Cate
 
gorization of aid was continued by the Board. The indigent sick, the
 
aged, the blind, and the orphaned children were aided but the able-bodied
 
poor person was still excluded. There were reorganizations of the Board i
 
in 1927 and 1928 as the Board became the Department of Social Welfare.
 
Still, no plans or provisions were made for the able-bodied unemployed.
 
THE 193Q'S
 
During the 1930's welfare philosophy changed. In particular, the
 
Great Depression had a lasting effect on welfare policy. First, after
 
1933 the federal government took an active role in relief for the first
 
Q Second, because of the large number of people who were destitute
 
it was perceived by policymakers that poverty was not necessarily the
 
fault of the poor. As a result, some type of relief was made available
 
to all who were able to prove that they were in need. Even so, cate­
37, Leiby, James, "State Welfare Administration in California,
 
1879 - 1929," California Historical Review 41 (May 1972), p. 175,
 
\
 
38, "California Conference of Social Work," Bulletin (Aug, 1928),
 
pp, 19-20,
 
39, Pierson, Harry E,, "The Changing Relief Picture," Tax Digest
 
19 (December 1941), p, 406.
 
13 
gorization and other forms of restriction persisted as the welfare rolls
 
expanded• The resulting conflict in welfare philosophy between the New
 
Deal philosophy of giving aid to everyone and the Poor Law philosophy
 
blaming the poor for their problems profoundly affected welfare policies
 
during the 1930's.^®
 
The aid ultimately given to the able-bodied poor was a unique hybrid
 
of these philosophies. Aid was given to all who applied, but it was in-­
variably in the form of work, not cash. And, there were other restrictions
 
as well. The result was the establishment of various work programs such
 
as the federal Works Progress Administration and the Civilian Conserva
 
tion Corps, and the creation of the work camps by the state of California.
 
These camps provided a less expensive solution to a potentially explosive
 
problem. California had the largest population of homeless in the United
 
States. This was due in large part to the migration by many from the
 
dust bowl region of the midwest. Many of these migrants, married or un
 
married, went to the work camps where they were sheltered and fed in
 
return for the work they performed. Other welfare programs restricted
 
aid to those who had resided in California for three years prior to their
 
request for aid, but the work camps were available to all.^^
 
40. Ibid.
 
41. Wood, Sammuel F., "Work Camps Or Nothing," Survey 75 (April,
 
1939), p. 99.
 
42. Ibid.
 
43. Ibid*
 
14 
Much of the federal legislation was more inclusive and expansionary.
 
Because there were so many able-bodied people who were out of work and
 
destitute in the United States, the Social Security laws of 1935 were
 
enacted. During the Great Depression there was no help for the workers
 
who had lost their savings due to bank failures nor any method of aiding
 
the future retirement of these workers. Social Security and its amendments
 
to aid the disabled worker and widows of workers as well as their chil
 
dren provided such aid and greatly reduced welfare rolls. The first
 
benefits from federal Social Security were paid in California in 1936.
 
In conjunction California passed the Old Age Security Act which supple
 
mented federal benefits.^^
 
Thus, welfare policy during the 1930's was both restrictive at the
 
state level and expansionary at the federal level. These contradictory
 
impulses persisted into the 1940's. Fluctuations in economic stability
 
and changes in political administration effectively created cycles in
 
welfare policy. For example, as recovery from the Great Depression be
 
gan, in the late 1930's and early 1940's, all forms of welfare once again
 
became more restrictive.
 
44. Social Security Act of Aug. 14, 1933, for a complete discus
 
sion see Altmeyer, Arthur J., The Formative Years of Social Security
 
(Madison, Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1968).
 
45. California Stats. 1936 Ex. Sess., Ch. 7, p. 11.
 
15 
1940'S TQ 1960
 
World War II brought about full employment as the economy gained
 
strength. By 1943, the work camps had disappeared. There were fewer
 
people in need and the problems of the poor became much less visible.
 
The federal government assumed ho further financial responsibility for
 
meeting needs due to unemployment through public assistance programs after
 
the work camps shut down.^^
 
The postwar boom continued until 1949 and unemployment remained at
 
a low level. But, recessions in 1949, 1953/54 and 1957/58 increased un
 
employment and reawakened images of the previous decade.
 
In response to economic pressures the 1957 legislature passed 70
 
measures affecting welfare. This was 50 percent more than had passed
 
during the 10 preceding years. New programs of public medical care and
 
aid to the permanently disabled were instituted. Programs for the blind
 
and dependent children were significantly improved. Of note also is
 
what the 1957 legislature failed to do. the two parent household re
 
mained on general relief funded solely by the counties of California.
 
Also, during this period, strong national pressures were brought
 
to provide unemployment insurance of some duration. Instead, on May 1961
 
the federal government included the unemployed single parent family under
 
46. tetiBroek, Jacobus, "Welfare in the 1957 Legislature," Cali
 
fornia Law Review 46 (August 1958), p. 330.
 
47. Ibid, p. 331.
 
16 
Aid to Dependent Children (ADC) However, if there were two parents
 
in the household only general assistance was available for the family.
 
The standards for families with two parents set by general relief were
 
far below the benefits available for one parent households through ADC.
 
THE 1960'S - WAR ON POVERTY
 
In the beginning of the 1960's, welfare practices continued in much
 
the same manner. Counties continued to care for those who did not qualify
 
for any other type of aid. However, in 1962 there were some changes in
 
the makeup of ADC welfare cases. Two parent households were now accepted
 
(AFDC-U) and thus were removed from the county general relief programs.
 
Categorization between one parent households (now AFDC) and AFDC-U cases
 
continues today. This is important because the change relieved county
 
welfare burdens.
 
In 1964, California instituted a "no work, no dole" plan. This
 
plan was intended to trim ever-increasing welfare rolls of both counties
 
and the state welfare programs. Unfortunately, the plan did not cut
 
the rolls.
 
48. PL. 87-31, Title IV, May 8, 1961.
 
49. Simmons, Harold E., Work Relief to Rehabilitation, (Sacra
 
mento, California: The Citadel Press, 1969), p. 135.
 
50. Ibid.
 
51. Ibid.
 
52. Smith, David C., "California 'No Work, No Dole' Plan Seeks To
 
Trim Welfare Rolls and Fill Farm Jobs," Wall Street Journal 164 (October
 
6, 1964), p. 6.
 
17 
In 1963 Lyndon B. Johnson became president of the United States.
 
He subsequently declared war on poverty. California accepted President
 
Johnson's programs to combat poverty early in 1965. Under California
 
Title V programs the state opened day care centers in order to enable the
 
able-bodied poor to go to work. Work experience and training centers and
 
centers for the care of the poor were also established.^^ In Los Angeles
 
county, federally funded housing repair was undertaken and retraining
 
programs instituted The Title V programs also concentrated on im
 
proving the education of the hard-core poor.^^
 
Though no comprehensive evaluation of the Title V programs was ever
 
undertaken, overall, the combination of social welfare and training did
 
improve the plight of many of the poor through 1970.
 
The impact of the Title V programs on the basic structure of gen
 
eral relief was profound. During the early 1960's welfare recipients on
 
general relief in California had risen to 86,000.^6 with the state ac­
■t 
ceptance of the Great Society programs in 1965, the general relief rolls 
fell to 36,000 as many recipients were absorbed into various federal 
programs. As the Great Society programs became more restrictive, gen­
53. Simmons, Work Relief, p. 193. 
54. Ibid. 
55. Ibid. 
56. California, Health and Welfare Agency, Department of Social 
Services, Statistical Services Branch, Public Welfare in California, PA3. 
18 
eral relief rolls again climbed. By 1970 there were 74,000 persons on
 
general relief.^^
 
Though the number of people fell and rose again the most dramatic
 
rise was in grant per recipient. In 1961 an average grant was $296.98
 
per year. The 1965 grant recipients received $401.68 average grant per
 
recipient per year.^^ Although the number of recipients had fallen the
 
amount per recipient had risen dramatically as money was shared by fewer
 
people. In 1970, the average grant per recipient was $461.88 per year.
 
The welfare rolls had again swelled but the grant did not decrease accord
 
ingly.®® As a result, the total cost of general relief grew from $25.6
 
million in 1961 to $34.1 million in 1970.®^
 
THE 1970^3
 
By 1970 California found that welfare costs had risen to a crisis
 
level. Approximately 2.3 million Californians were receiving welfare
 
benefits of all kinds, an almost fourfold increase in ten years. In 1970
 
alone, the welfare caseload had increased by 20 percent. About 40,000
 
57. Ibid, 1970.
 
58. All dollar amounts are shown in 1967 dollars. Public Welfare,
 
1961.
 
59. Public Welfare, 1965.
 
60. Ibid, 1970.
 
61. Ibid, 1961 and 1970.
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additional recipients were being added monthly. The increasing costs
 
were going to have to be met by large increases in state and local taxes
 
• • 63
 
or by the discontinuance of other needed public projects.
 
Control of welfare restrictions had grown lax in the late 1960's
 
when many expected President Nixon's Family Assistance Plan, which guar
 
anteed a minimum income, to be passed by Congress. Because of this, a
 
sense of relief resulted in the abandonment of any reform efforts. It
 
was thought that the federal government would soon take over all welfare
 
programs.
 
In 1971, California found that the federal government did not take
 
over the welfare /programs and that welfare costs continued to increase.
 
The state officials under the guidance of then-Governor Ronald Reagan
 
instituted welfare reforms. They set out to trim from the welfare rolls
 
those who had no business receiving welfare payments (according to state
 
criteria for recipients) and to prevent new applicants from joining the
 
welfare rolls if they were ineligible A program to educate those who
 
were eligible for welfare but not aware of it was begun.
 
62. Anderson, Martin, Welfare (Stanford, California: ^ Hoover
 
Institute Press, 1978), p. 154.
 
63. "Ways to Get Welfare In Hand: Success For Two Big States,"
 
U.S. News and World Report 75 (December 24, 1974), p. 66.
 
64. "Governor Reagan's Welfare Reform: Plans, Problems and Pros
 
pects," California Journal 2 (March, 1971), p. 63.
 
65. Anderson, Welfare, p. 155.
 
66. lbid.
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There was a move to make existing welfare laws more restrictive and
 
at the same time to carefully enforce existing laws. According to Martin
 
Anderson, Welfare the results were dramatic:
 
"By June 1973 there were 352,000 fewer people receiving public
 
welfare in California than there were in March 1971. About
 
785,000 fewer people were on the welfare roll^than had been
 
projected on the assumptions of no reforms*
 
The interpretation of these results is subject to some controversy.
 
According to Harold Simmons, the Reagan reforms produced a more cost-

oriented welfare philosophy.^® On the other hand, Barbara Joe recalls
 
that the state was experiencing a decline in the state rate of growth and
 
that increased demand for emplojnnent actually was the cause of the welfare
 
rolls declining.®^
 
Another work program was instituted by the 1971 reform law. This
 
work program required all able-bodied persons on any type of state or
 
federal welfare to work 20 hours per week. Most counties instituted work
 
programs for general relief recipients as well. This work program was
 
very successful as many people were trained and subsequently employed,
 
thus reducing the welfare rolls.
 
67. Ibid, p. 156.
 
68. Simmons, Harold E., Recycling the 1601 Elizabethan Poor Law
 
(Sacramento, California: General Welfare Publications, 1975), p. 87.
 
69. Joe, Barbara F., "Reagan's Welfare Fraud," Washington Monthly
 
28 (October 1980), p. 34.
 
70. Lubin, Joann S., "California Puts People On Welfare To Work In
 
A Controversial Test," Wall Street Journal 180 (October 20, 1972), p. 1.
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Despite the general restrictiveness of the 1971 reforms, the Poor
 
Law philosophy contained in general relief policy did change to some
 
degree during this period. Residency requirements in most counties were
 
reduced to proof of intent to stay in the county. This could be substan
 
tiated by a current rent receipt. The few counties that did not adopt
 
this policy reduced residency requirements to one year.^^
 
Another restriction that was dropped from general relief was the
 
relatives* responsibility clause. No longer were wealthier relatives
 
held responsible for general relief costs. However, these two changes
 
were small considering other general relief policies discussed below.
 
Overall, welfare costs were stabilized until 1978 and caseloads
 
decreased. But, with the passage of Proposition 13 in 1978, property
 
tax reform meant fewer funds for welfare programs. This was a period of
 
intense readjustment for California at all levels of government. It
 
should be noted that welfare policy became even more restrictive because
 
of the lack of available funds.
 
71. California Welfare and Institutions Code.
 
72. Ibid.
 
73. '*Whither Human Services?*' Western City (March 1979), p. 4.
 
74. Ibid.
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THE 1980'S
 
Welfare policy has continued to be restrictive. An important
 
continuing factor in qualifying for welfare is the requirement of a
 
permanent street address. However, in the 80's many sleep in the street
 
or in tents. This is a period of high unemplojnnent and the permanent
 
address requirement can't be met by those who can't afford rent.
 
In addition, due to the cut-off of funds for AFDG-U families by the
 
state and federal governments in January 1983, (because of scarcity of
 
federal funding) many have been forced back onto the general relief rolls.
 
Many have also joined the ranks of the unemployed and homeless. In some
 
parts of California churches have opened their doors at night in order
 
that these people have a place to sleep.
 
With the inauguration of Governor George Deukmejian in January 1983,
 
once again there is a call for welfare reform. To date Deukmejian's
 
principal policy seems to be"work for welfare." This policy has been
 
instituted before and the objective is to reduce welfare costs.
 
Currently, 2.2 million Californians receive welfare benefits of all
 
kinds. The federal government pays $3.2 billion of this cost, the state
 
75. Raposa, Ron, "Tattered Tent Is Home For Jobless Family," The
 
Press Enterprise 105 (February 28, 1983), p. B-3.
 
76. "Homeless Get a Place to Sleep Atop Nob Hill," The New York
 
Times 132 (January 18, 1983), p. 7.
 
77. Weller, Don "Deukmejian To Seek Big Welfare Change," The Press
 
Enterprise 105 (February 26, 1983), p. 1.
 
78. Ibid.
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about $2.75 billion, and the counties $330 million, mostly for general
 
relief. Like the federal government, the state wants to return more
 
welfare programs to the local levels of government. Thus, welfare policy
 
in the 1980's seems increasingly likely to resemble the Elizabethan poor
 
laws of the 1600's.
 
CYCLES OF WELFARE ACTIVITY
 
Until the Great Depression welfare philosophy and policies in the
 
United States and California were generally restrictive. A new philo
 
sophy of welfare for all was born of the overwhelming need caused by the
 
Depression.®® The alteration between these philosophies begun during the
 
Great Depression continues to this day.
 
As World War II created full-employment, welfare policy again became
 
restrictive. But when the war ended in 1945 there was a loosening of
 
welfare polilcy to meet emplo3rment reductions in the post-war economy.®^
 
From 1950 to 1957 welfare rolls generally, and county general relief
 
rolls specifically, stabilized and more social programs were added by
 
79. Ibid, (all dollars in 1983 amounts).
 
80. See Piven, Frances Fox and Richard A. Cloward, Regulating the
 
Poor (New York: Random House, 1971) and The New Class War (New York:
 
Random House, 1982) for discussion of the national welfare policies and
 
how they are used to control the poor.
 
81. Ibid.
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the 1957 legislature to aid those who had not been helped by state pro
 
grams before.
 
The state continued in an expansionary mode through the Great Society
 
programs of the 1960*s. However, by 1971 California was met by ever in
 
creasing welfare costs and another reform again restricted welfare.
 
The restrictiveness of the 1971 reform was magnified by the 1978
 
passage of Proposition 13 which again cut state and local revenues. Faced
 
with budget shortfalls in the 1983/84 fiscal year the state welfare policy
 
has become even more restrictive in scope. The counties are especially
 
short of revenue and their policies for general relief remain very res
 
trictive.®^
 
GENERAL RELIEF IN CALIFORNIA
 
In August of 1935 the fiftieth session of the legislature reaf
 
firmed the laws governing the indigent in California. General relief
 
from that day forward was to continue as a county affair to be adminis
 
tered by county welfare department in conjunction with county boards of
 
supervisors. These programs were to be funded solely by the counties.®^
 
82. See Jacobus tenBroek, "The 1957 Legislature."
 
83. Counties show evidence of these shortages through their freezes
 
on hiring and cutbacks in county services.
 
84. Hornet, Vaughn Davis, California Social Welfare (Englewood
 
Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1956), p. 82.
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General relief is available to any poor person who does not qualify
 
for other categories of state and federal aid. These programs can be
 
considered programs of last resort.
 
Even so, most counties in California have some standards that must
 
be met before general relief is given to a recipient. Some of the prin
 
ciples of the Poor Laws are embodied in these programs. Based on require
 
ments, even at this level there are deserving and non-deserving poor.
 
Some of the restrictions placed on general relief applicants include
 
the necessity of a permanent street address, limits on the amount of cash,
 
personal property, and equity in an auto or home that an applicant can
 
QC
have.°° This was substantiated by the survey this author conducted of
 
all 58 counties in California.
 
Under California law, counties can establish almshouses and county
 
Q
 
farms.®' State law also permits counties to take action which would
 
benefit the indigent sick.®8 Counties can also bury the indigent dead;
 
this is commonly done.®^ Non-residents of a county are to be given emer
 
gency aid only.
 
85. Ibid.
 
86. See Appendix B,
 
87. California Welfare and Institutions Code, Section 2400. A
 
farm may be established. Section 205.
 
88. Section 200.
 
89. Section 207.
 
90. Section 2501.
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Counties may also require that the able-bodied work for the general relief
 
they receive.
 
That the counties may do these various things does not keep them
 
from doing others or from not doing all of the items stated above. The
 
area of county general relief programs is as varied as the 58 counties
 
in California. State mandate requires that the counties maintain a pro
 
gram for the aid of indigents, but the implementations of these programs
 
are myriad.
 
For example, Sacramento county has recently instituted the use of
 
a poorhouse. Currently, no cash assistance or food stamps are given to
 
those who apply for and accept general relief. Instead, since October
 
1982, people are sent to the Bannon Street house which is run solely for
 
county general relief recipients. There they are fed and given a place
 
to sleep. They are required to work 3 days per week for this welfare
 
program. The effect of this program has been to cut the welfare rolls
 
and welfare costs dramatically. Sacramento county's welfare program costs
 
have dropped from $6.7 million per year to $118,000 per year.^^ Actually,
 
91. Section 2305.
 
92. See Appendices A and B.
 
93. Taylor, Ronald B., "Needy Denied Cash Aid, Sent to Poorhouse
 
Instead," Los Angeles Times 102 (February 21, 1983), p. 1.
 
94. Ibid.
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general relief applicants are refusing this type of aid in Sacramento
 
county; instead, they are sleeping on the streets.
 
Other counties are observing the Sacramento experiment and a re
 
turn of poorhouses may be seen under the general relief programs. This
 
would again further restrict general relief policies.
 
95. Ibid.
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Chapter 2
 
CROSS-SECTIONAL STUDY OF GENERAL RELIEF
 
Introduction
 
In the previous chapter the cyclical nature of welfare policy was
 
noted. In particular, the evidence suggested that welfare policy at all
 
levels was profoundly influenced by changes iii $uch external factors as
 
the state of the economy and the political environment. The welfare
 
system responded to these changes by manipulating the only policy vari
 
ables which were sensitive to direct action by welfare administrators.
 
These variables were the eligibility requirements, grant per recipient,
 
and work restrictions necessary for admission to the programs. In other
 
words, the welfare system responds to economic and political changes in
 
its policy environment by manipulating just those factors which link
 
current welfare policy to the Elizabethan Poor Laws. The use of eligi
 
bility classification as a tool to manage the growth of the system is as
 
prevalent now as it was in the 1600Vs.
 
General relief poliGy is especially sensitive to the influences
 
discussed above. As noted in the previous chapter, general relief re
 
presents the last link in the safety net before the recipient drops
 
entirely out of the system. This means that recipients who receive gen
 
eral relief are generally not eligible for federal- and state-funded re
 
lief. As eligibility requirements are manipulated at the federal and
 
state level, the county general relief rolls will fluctuate. As a result,
 
county-funded general relief policies will reflect not only national
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political and economic trends, but state-level and county-level forces
 
as well.
 
The purpose of the next two chapters is to analyze the forces
 
which influence county commitment to general relief programs. Two dif
 
ferent approaches to this problem are possible. The first approach is
 
to explain differences across counties in California. This approach is
 
important because different counties face different combinations of
 
economic development, revenue sources, and political context in attempt
 
ing to establish viable general relief policies. The second approach is
 
to aggregate county-level general relief data to the state level and look
 
for state-level factors which influence the aggregate county decisions
 
across time.
 
The latter approach will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.
 
In this Chapter the concentration will be on explaining cross-county
 
differences.
 
^ The available policy literature suggests that policy decision-

making operates within three sets of constraints.^^ These three sets of
 
constraints are structural factors, political factors, and policy fac
 
tors. The most important structural factors are size (population) of the
 
county, economic conditions of the county (e.g., unemplojnnent rate), and
 
96. Hawkins, Brett W., Politics and Urban Policies (Indianapolis:
 
Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1971), pp. 3-18. See also Thomas R. Dye,
 
"A Model for the Analysis of Policy Outcomes," Policy Analysis in Pol
 
itical Science, Ira Sharkansky, ed. (Chicago: Markham Publishing Co.,
 
1970), pp. 21-38.
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financial condition of the county (e.g., county government revenue from
 
all sources).®^ The major political constraint is the political complex
 
ion of the county (e.g., the Democratic or Republican makeup of the
 
electorate).^® Size of the county is important because population is a
 
composite of the influences of such variables as population density,
 
urbanization, degree of industrialization, and level of economic deve
 
lopment.9^ In short, size represents the economies of scale associated
 
with large population. These economies of scale will have a direct impact
 
on a county's general relief policies. Urban counties and those with
 
higher levels of development will have more diversified sources of revenue
 
and are also more likely to have those classes of individuals who have a
 
greater probability of being eligible for general relief. Therefore,
 
these counties are more likely to have more liberal general relief policies
 
97. Dye, "A Model for the Analysis of Policy Outcomes."
 
98. Ibid.
 
99. Ibid.
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and a greater proportion of recipients,^®®
 
Economic conditions are relevant because the economy of each Cali
 
fornia county will have a direct bearing on the potential pool of people
 
eligible for general relief.1®^ The differences across counties in the
 
size of this pool may well have a direct bearing on the restrictiveness
 
of each county's policies and the total proportion of the county popula
 
tion on general relief.
 
Financial conditions are significant because the size of the
 
available funding will directly influence the restrictiveness of general
 
relief policy.^®2 Finally, political complexion is important because the
 
100. For studies of the impact of urbanization and population on
 
welfare payments and number of recipients, see Hawkins, Politics and
 
Urban Policies, p. 70; Dye, Thomas R., Politics, Economics and the Pub
 
lic: Policy Outcomes in the American States (Chicago: Rand-McNally,
 
1966), pp. 115-148; Dawson, Richard E. and James A. Robinson, "The Poli
 
tics of Welfare," in Politics In The American States^ Herbert Jacobs and
 
Kenneth N. Vines, eds. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1965), pp.
 
371-410; Sharkansky, Ira and Richard I. Hofferbert, "Dimensions of State
 
Politics, Economics, and Public Policy,": American Political Science
 
Review 63 (September, 1969), pp. 867-879. Of course, not all heavily
 
populated counties will have liberal relief policies. Such reputedly
 
conservative counties as San Bernardino County and Orange County may well
 
have general relief policies more restrictive than expected for their
 
population. However, the regression techniques which will be described
 
in more detail below calculate the degree to which a linear relationship
 
is the best model to describe the relationship between population and
 
policy restrictiveness. A highly positive correlation between these
 
variables would support the hypothesis even though some counties may be
 
more restrictive than predicted.
 
101. Ibid;
 
102. Ibid.
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Democratic party and Democratic voters are generally perceived to be more
 
sympathetic to those on welfare
 
The policy factors include all policy decisions which are directly
 
under the control of county welfare administrators• For general relief
 
policies these decisions tend to focus on eligibility restrictions.
 
Specifically, county decision-makers can require recipients to work in a
 
county work program, can restrict the amount of cash and personal property
 
the recipient may have and still be eligible, can restrict the eligibility
 
of recipients with equity in an automobile or home and can manipulate the
 
size of an individual*s maximum grant. All of these policy restric
 
tions will have a dampening affect on outputs from the general relief
 
system.
 
The interrelationships among the structural factors can be examined
 
using a variety of statistical methods. It is possible to develop these
 
interrelationships in the form of a series of causal hypotheses. In
 
general, the structural factors should influence the political factors.
 
The structural and political factors should have some causal impact on
 
the policy factors. Finally, all three of these factors should have
 
direct impact on general relief policy outcomes such as county caseload
 
103. For example, see, McClosky, Herbert, Paul J. Huffman and
 
Rosemary O'Hara, "Issue Conflict and Consensus Among Party Leaders and
 
Followers," American Political Science Review 54 (1960), pp. 406-472.
 
104. See work requirements, eligibility restrictions and grant
 
ceilings for all 58 counties in California in APPENDIX B.
 
105; For a more detailed explication of these interrelations, see
 
the discussion in the sections on the theoretical model and the causal
 
model of structural political, and policy factors in this chapter.
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and average amount of the grant.
 
The data for this analysis are drawn from the period 1974 through
 
1982.^®^ However, data on the policy factors are only available in 1981
 
and 1982. The 1981 data which focuses solely on the size of the maximum
 
grant per county is drawn from a study by the California Department of
 
Social Services.^®® The 1982 data is drawn from a personal survey by
 
the author of all 58 county Department of Social Services in Califor
 
nia.^®^ Records of general relief eligibility requirements and work
 
programs are not documented at the state level. The 1981 study repre
 
sents the first such endeeivor of centralized collection of information.
 
Given the lack of information on policy factors prior to 1981, only
 
the impact of the structural and political factors on general relief
 
caseload and average grant can be assessed for the entire period of 1974
 
through 1982. Despite this limitation, an analysis of the changes in the
 
relative influence of each of the variables can provide valuable infor
 
mation about the impact of variations in the structural and political
 
environment. This analysis will be performed using multiple regression.
 
The multiple regression technique allows a separate estimate of the in­
106. The expected directions of these interrelationships are
 
described in more detail in the following sections of this chapter.
 
107. See footnote 121 below.
 
108. Study provided to the author by Raymond Patrick, Staff De
 
velopment Supervisor, County of Sonoma, Social Services Department.
 
109. See APPENDIX A and B.
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fluence of each variable controlling for the effects of all the other
 
variables in the equation.
 
The availability of data on the policy factors allows for a more
 
sophisticated analysis of the 1982 data. Using the technique of path
 
analysis, it is possible to analyze the direct and indirect impact of all
 
the variables in a causal diagram. Multiple regression only assesses the
 
direct effect of each causal variable on the variable under study. It does
 
not allow the researcher to assess the interrelationships among the causal
 
factors. Path analysis provides a mechanism for analyzing such interre
 
lationships.^^^
 
The previous discussion is developed in more detail in the rest of
 
this chapter. The next section presents in discursive form the predicted
 
relationships among the $tructural factors (population of county, economic
 
condition of county, and financial condition of county), political factors
 
(the Democratic or Republican influence in the county), policy factors
 
(the overall restrictiveness of general relief eligibility requirements),
 
and the predicted policy outcomes (general relief caseload per county and
 
average grant per county). These predictions are drawn from the avail­
110. For a more detailed discussion of the multiple regression
 
technique, see Nie, Norman H., C. Hadlai Hull, Jean G. Jenkins, Karin
 
Steinbrenner, and Dale H. Bent, Statistical Package for the Social
 
Sciences, 2nd ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1975), pp. 320­
367. The computer programs used throughout this study are SPSS programs.
 
111. For a more detailed discussion of path analysis, see Asher,
 
Herbert B., Causal Modeling, Sage University Paper series on Quantitative
 
Applications in the Social Sciences, 07-003 (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Pub
 
lications, Inc., 1976).
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able literature on the impact of structural, political, and policy vari
 
ables on policy outcomes These predictions are presented as a series
 
of hypotheses and are summarized in Figure 1.
 
The section on the impact of structural and political variables
 
presents the results of the multiple regressions of general relief case
 
load and average grant per county on county population, county unemploy
 
ment rate, county revenue per capita and county Democratic voting devia
 
tion for 1974 to 1982. The section concludes with a discussion of the
 
implications of the findings.
 
The section on the causal model of structural, political, and policy
 
factors operationalizes the causal model presented in Figure 1. Some of
 
the predictions are changed to conform with the indicators used. The
 
revised causal model is presented in Figure 2. Separate path analyses
 
for general relief caseload and average grant are presented in Figures 3
 
and 4. The accuracy of the original model is then examined. The section
 
concludes with a discussion of the implications of the path analysis
 
models.
 
The chapter ends with a summary of the statistical models and an
 
examination of their consequences.
 
112. See footnotes 113 through 123 in the next section for the
 
available literature.
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THEORETICAL MODEL
 
Structural and Political Factors
 
A search of the available literature suggests a number of possible
 
effects of structural and political factors on each other and on more
 
explicitly policy-oriented variables. The structural conditions of a
 
county ultimately influence both the restrictiveness of general relief
 
policies and the outcomes of those policies, such as caseload and
 
expenditures per case. Of these conditions, the most important is the
 
size of the county. Size is a composite of many factors such as pop
 
ulation, population density, urbanization, degree of industrialization,
 
and level of economic development. In short, size represents a whole
 
host of economies of scale associated with the differing economies and
 
social structures of the various counties.
 
In general, the more populated the county, the more complex its
 
economic structure and therefore, the less likely it will be affected by
 
a poor nationwide economy. Conversely, smaller counties with simpler
 
economic structures (i.e. based on a single industry such as the lumber
 
industry) are likely to be more sensitive to changes in the national
 
economy.
 
113. Hofferbert, Richard 1., "Socioeconomic Dimensions of the
 
American States: 1890-1960," Midwest Journel of Political Science 12
 
(August 1968), pp. 401-418; Sharkansky and Hofferbert, "Dimensions of
 
State Politics, Economics and Public Policy."
 
114. Dye, "Politics, Economics, and the Public," pp. 7-10.
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The population of the county can also directly affect financial
 
conditions in county governments. Larger counties should have a more
 
diverse source of funds and a larger property tax base. By contrast,
 
smaller counties may be expected to have many fewer sources of income.^^^
 
Size can influence the political context of a county. Larger
 
counties, because of their greater complexity, industrialization, and
 
urbanization, are likely to have more blue-collar workers, more lower
 
income families and greater ethnic diversity. These groups tend to be
 
Democratic and liberal in political orientation. Rural counties are
 
inclined to be more homogeneous, less industrialized, and, therefore,
 
more Republican and conservative.
 
Population will also directly and indirectly affect the general
 
relief policies in the counties. The indirect effects of population will
 
be transmitted through economic conditions, financial conditions, and the
 
political context. The direct effects of population on relief policy
 
will manifest themselves in several ways. First, counties with larger
 
minority and low-income populations tend to have less restrictive gen
 
eral relief policies. Second, in larger counties a greater proportion
 
of the population are in need of general relief and there are greater
 
115. Hofferbert, "Socioeconomic Dimensions;" Hawkins, "Politics
 
and Urban Policies," pp. 113-120.
 
116. Bone, Hugh A. and Austin Ranney, Politics and Voters, 2nd
 
ed., (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967), pp. 49-52; See also Nie, Norman H.,
 
Sidney Verba, John R. Petrocik, The Changing American Voter, enlarged
 
edition, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979).
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caseloads. Third, total expenditures per case are usually higher in
 
counties that have more of the composite factors of size. This is likely
 
to be so because the bigger welfare organizations required in larger
 
counties generate their own policy momentum and generally increase
 
benefits as a result. ^
 
Economic factors, such as the rate of inflation, the unemployment
 
rate, factory utilization, and interest rates reflect the general eco
 
nomic well-being of the county. This general economic climate can cause
 
variation in general relief policy. However, this impact may be contra
 
dictory in some counties. Less restrictive policies are likely to lead
 
to increased caseloads and expenditures. By contrast, economic differ
 
ences directly influence the size of the caseload and expenditures per
 
case for general relief. It is possible that counties with better
 
economies have fewer cases and lower expenditures.^^®
 
At the same time, the revenue and expenditures of county govern
 
ments can make changes in general relief within the county. These
 
financial conditions are influenced and interrelated with population and
 
economic differences. If the economy is healthy, it is likely that more
 
tax revenues will be received by the county. Given this situation, it is
 
117. Dye, "Politics, Economics, and the Public," pp. 115-148;
 
Tompkins, Gary L.,"A Causal Model of State Welfare Expenditures," Journal
 
of Politics 37 (May 1973), pp. 392-416; Dawson and Robinson, "The Politics
 
of Welfare."
 
118. Ibid.
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highly probable that financial conditions within county government would
 
be very good and general relief policies could tend to be quite liberal.
 
Under liberal financial conditions it is possible that general relief
 
caseload and expenditures per case would expand.
 
Another factor which influences general relief policy is the poli
 
tical context of the county. Policy will vary depending on the conser­
vativeness or liberalness of county government. If a county constituency
 
has elected a strong Republican government, county policies will likely
 
be Very conservative. At the opposite end of the scale, if a strong
 
Democratic county government is elected, general relief policies could
 
be potentially very liberal. The political makeup of the county is re
 
lated to the size of the county and the economic and financial conditions.
 
By the same measure, caseload and probable expenditures per case for
 
general relief may change depending on the political makeup of county
 
government. Liberal policies may result in larger caseloads and pay
 
ments, while conservative policies should result iti the opposite.^^®
 
Policy Factors
 
Besides structural factors, there are also policy factors which
 
influence general relief programs. These policy factors directly relate
 
to the overall restrictiveness of the general relief policies.
 
119. Ibid.
 
120. Ibid.
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there are three categories of restrictiveness which affect general
 
relief policies. They are:
 
1.) The monthly amount of the grant given to a general
 
relief recipient.
 
2.) The economic restrictions placed on eligibility
 
for the grant, such as upper limits on cash,
 
personal property, automobiles and a home the
 
recipient may possess and still remain eligible
 
for general relief.
 
3.) The requirement that the recipient must work off
 
the amount - usually on a county work project.^^1
 
These policy factors will affect the caseload as fewer people will
 
receive aid because they do not meet eligibility standards, they are un
 
willing to work for the money received or the size of the grant is con
 
sidered too small to live on. In all these cases restrictive policies
 
cause caseload to stay the same or tP decrease.
 
Grant per person, economic restrictions, and emplo)nnent restric
 
tiveness can have a positive effect on expenditures per case. If case
 
load is affected negatively through policy factors, it is possible that
 
there will be more dollars to be given to fewer people and, thus more
 
dollars per person.
 
121. See APPENDIX A and B 
122. Ibid. 
123. Ibid. 
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A Causal Model of County Relief Policy
 
The 	discussion above can be summarized by the model in Figure 1.
 
This 	figure suggests the following hypotheses.
 
1. Counties with higher populations are likely to have:
 
a. 	better economies (+)
 
b. 	more revenue (+)
 
c. 	a more Democratic political culture (+)
 
d. 	less restrictive (more liberal) eligibility and
 
grant requirements (-)
 
e. a larger general relief caseload (+)
 
f• more relief expenditures per case (+).
 
2. 	 Counties with better economies are likely to have:
 
a. 	more revenue (+)
 
b. 	less restrictive (more liberal) eligibility and
 
grant requirements (-)
 
c. 	a smaller general relief caseload (-)
 
d. 	more relief expenditures per case (+).
 
3. 	 Counties with more revenue are likely to have:
 
a. 	less restrictive (more liberal) eligibility and
 
grant requirements (-)
 
b. 	a larger general relief caseload ('f)
 
c. 	more relief expenditures per case (+).
 
4. 	 Counties with more Democratic voting populations are
 
likely to have:
 
a. 	less restrictive (more liberal) eligibility and
 
grant requirements (-)
 
b. 	a larger general relief caseload (+)
 
c. 	more relief expenditures per case (+).
 
5. 	 Counties with more restrictive eligibility and grant
 
requirements are likely to have.
 
a. 	a smaller general relief caseload (-)
 
b. 	more relief expenditures per case (+).
 
Figure 1 about here
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These factors will be further examined and refined in the next two
 
sections. The changing impact of the structural variables over a nine
 
year period (1974 - 1982) will be explored. Attempts will also be made
 
to produce a causal model of the structural and policy factors which af
 
fect caseload and expenditure during the year 1982.
 
IMPACT OF STRUCTURAL AND POLITICAL VARIABLE
 
The ideal situation would be the development of causal models in
 
cluding both structural and policy factors (maximum grants, eligibility
 
requirements, and work restrictions) for the entire period of the study.
 
However, data on policy factors are available only for 1982. Even so, it
 
is possible to get some idea of the changing influences of the structural
 
factors over the research period. This across-years design should allow
 
a stronger assessment of the independent variables than would be the case
 
with a single-year cross-sectional study.
 
124. The data for the analysis below were derived from the follow
 
ing sources: Caseload and average grant - State of California, Health
 
and Welfare Agency, Department of Social Services, Public Welfare in Cali
 
fornia PA 3, (1973 through 1982); Population - U.S. Census (1980), Pop
 
ulation Estimates of California Cities and Counties. Department of Fin
 
ance,Population Research Unit,(1974 through 1979 and 1981, 1982); Revenue
 
- State of California, Controllers Office, Annual Report of Financial
 
Transactions Concerning Counties of California, (1974 through 1981),
 
information for 1982 was supplied by Mike Havey of the Controller's Office,
 
by telephone; Inflation rate - California Statistical Abstracts. Con
 
sumer Price Index (1974 through 1982); Vote and Voter Registration - State
 
of California, Secretary of State, Statement of the Vote for General
 
Elections and Voter Registration. (1972 through 1982); Unemployment Rate
 
- State of California Employment Development Department, Employment Data
 
and Research Department, (1974 through 1982).
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Operationalization of the structural variables can be accomplished 
through indicators representihg size, economic conditions / financial con 
ditions/and political makeup of the county. Indicators of the depen 
dent variables, caseload and expenditures per case, also can be developed. 
The measure of size of counties used was pppulation logged to the 
base ten to even out extreme cases.^25 Population was considered the 
best indicator because population represents the factors of population 
density, urbanization, degree of industrialization and the level of 
economic development. Virtually all previous research studies examining 
census data have shown that population is highly related to all these 
factors and these sets of variables usually occur together. In other 
words, counties with large population tend to be highly urbanized, heavily 
industrialized, and maintain a high level of financial complexity. 
The economic conditions are best measured using the unemployment 
rate by county by year. This variabie was considered the best because 
it reflects most accurately the changes in the economic well-being of the 
county. But, it is also used because unemployment rate is one of the few 
125. Population was logged to the base ten because Los Angeles 
County produced a skewed distribution. Use of the raw population data 
produced curvilinear relationships with the other variables. Logging a 
skewed variable brings extreme cases back in. 
126. For example, see Hofferbert,"Socioeconomic Dimensions." 
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measures of economic conditions which is published by county as far back
 
as 1974.^27 should be noted, however, that the use of unemployment
 
rates as an indicator reverses the predictions of the causal model since
 
higher rates indicate worse conditions.
 
Financial conditions of the counties can be stated as the total
 
revenue from all sources available to a county. This was used as the
 
most direct indicator of the financial condition because this measure is
 
sensitive to policy changes. Such changes as Proposition 13 in 1978 dra
 
matically affected most counties' revenue. The overall financial health
 
of a county is, therefore, directly related to revenue received. For
 
this study revenue of the counties was divided by population to obtain
 
revenue per capita. Revenue per capita for all years was expressed in
 
1967 dollars, based on the California Consumer Price Index. Unfortunately,
 
the result was a skewed distribution dominated by a few outliers. Because
 
of this, the log to the base ten was used to even the distribution of
 
revenue over counties. San Francisco County was only included in 1982.
 
In earlier years the county did not report its revenue.
 
The most consistent measure of political makeup over the period of
 
the study was partisanship. Partisanship was measured by the Democratic
 
127. For this Study, Imperial County was excluded because of its
 
abnormally high unemployment rate from 1974 to 1982. Extreme outliers
 
produce biased regression results by skewing the slope coefficients. Loss
 
of information is balanced by a more stable estimate for the other 57
 
counties.
 
128. See footnote 125 above.
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voting deviation from the state mean. To minimize idiosyncratic variation
 
from election to election, an average deviation was created from Democratic
 
voter registration advantages and Democratic advantages in gubernatorial
 
and Presidential elections.
 
Caseload can be defined as single individuals on general home relief
 
within a county. In order to remove contamination from population, fig
 
ures are expressed as cases per 10,000 population. Family cases on general
 
relief were not considered, as family case data used for this study did,
 
not give indications of the number of people in each family. Again, be
 
cause some counties (e.g. San Francisco) had abnormally high case loads,
 
the log to the base ten was taken to even the distribution.
 
Expenditures per case were translated as the average grant per month
 
per single individual. Family cases were excluded for the reasons given
 
above.
 
The impact of the structural variables on logged caseload per 10,000
 
population and average grant per month for any year can be measured by a
 
regression model:
 
Logged Cases/10,000 = A + (Logged Population) + B2 (Logged
 
Revenue per Capita) + B3 (Democratic
 
Deviation) + B4 (Unemployment Rate) + E
 
The least-squares estimates for the equations from 1974 to 1982 are re
 
produced in Table 1.
 
129. Example: 1974 Democratic Deviation = i (County Democratic
 
Vote % for Governor - State Democratic Vote % for Governor) i (County
 
Democratic Voter Registration % - State Democratic Voter Registration %).
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Table la and lb about here
 
The R-squared represents the percent of variance in the dependent
 
variables explained by all the independent variables used in each equation.
 
The average R-square over the nine year period for logged cases per 10,000
 
is .48 and the comparable figure for average grants is .47. Essentially,
 
this means that almost one-half of the variations of both dependent vari
 
ables over the entire period was accounted for by logged population, log
 
ged revenue, democratic deviation and the unemployment rate.
 
The coefficient in a regression equation represents the effect that
 
a one-unit change in the independent variable will have on the dependent
 
variable while all other variables are held constant. For example, in
 
1974, a one-unit difference between counties in the logged population
 
produces a .382 unit change in the log of general relief cases per 10,000.
 
The comparable figure for a unit change in logged revenue is .444 units.
 
For a one-unit change in the Democratic deviation, the effect is .018
 
units of change in logged cases. Finally, a one-unit change in the un
 
employment rate produces a .017 unit drop in the log of cases. The in
 
terpretation for other years is identical.
 
In similar fashion, for the average grant in 1974, a one-unit dif
 
ference in the log of population across counties is associated with a
 
$10.65 higher average general relief grant. A one-unit change in the log
 
of revenue produces a $25.59 drop in the average grant. And, a variation
 
of one percent in Democratic deviation is associated with a $.35 fluctua
 
tion in the average amount received by a recipient. Lastly, a one-per­
TABLE 1
 
LEAST SQUARES REGRESSION ESTIMATES FOR LOGGED CASES AND AVERAGE GRANT
 
Year R-Squared 
1974 .45 LGCASE74 = 
1975 .45 LGCASE75 = 
1976 .47 LGCASE76 = 
1977 .55 LGCASE77 = 
1978 .52 LGCASE78 = 
1979 .56 LGCASE79 = 
1980 .45 LGCASE80 = 
1981 .43 LGCASE81 = 
1982 .44 LGCASE82 = 
la: LOGGED CASES
 
Least Squares Equations
 
-1.983 + .382LOGPOP74 + .444LGREV74 + .018DEMDEV72 - .017UNEMP74
 
(.097) (.445) (.009) (.019
 
-1.775 + .414LOGPOP75 + .226LGREV75 + .010DEMDEV74 + .000UNEMP75
 
(.092) (.432) (.010) 

-1.479 + .395LOGPOP76 + .147LGREV76 + .005DEMDEV74 

(.084) (.453) (.009) 

-1.930 + .415LOGPOP77 + .365LGREV77 + .012DEMDEV76 

(.087) (.385) (.010) 

-2.456 + .387LOGPOP78 + .751LGREV78 + .015DEMDEV76 

(.085) (.377) (.011) 

-3.219 + .364LOGPOP79 +1.088LGREV79 + .033DEMDEV78 

(.095) (.358) (.012) 

-2.441 + .349LOGPOP80 + .735LGREV80 + .029DEMDEV78 

(.113) (.428) (.013) 

-2.986 + .412LOGPOP81 + .808LGREV81 + .024DEMDEV80 

(.112) (.466) (.012) 

-1.828 + .324LOGPOP82 + .507LGREV82 + .027DEMDEV80 

(.100) (.323) (.011) 

(.016)
 
- .004UNEMP76
 
(.020)
 
- .022UNEMP77
 
(.019)
 
- .054UNEMP78
 
(.020)
 
- .042UNEMP79
 
(.020)
 
- .026UNEMP80
 
(.018)
 
- .018UNEMP81
 
(.017)
 
- .015UNEMP82
 
(.014)
 
Note: LGCASE equals logged cases per 10,000; LOGPOP equals logged population; LGREV equals logged ^
 
revenue; DEMDEV equals Democratic deviation; UNEMP equals the unemplo5nnent rate. °°
 
  
 
 
 
 
TABLE 1 (Contd.)
 
lb: AVERAGE GRANT
 
Year R-Squared Least Squares Equations 
1974 .43 AVGPAY74 = 58.544 + 10.646LOGPOP74 
( 4.533) 
- 25.590LGREV74 
(20.844) 
+ .345DEMDEV72 - 1.163UNEMP74 
(.441) ( .869) 
1975 .49 AVGPAY75 = -16.123 + 16.618LOGPOP75 
( 3.920) 
- 11.863LGREV75 
(18.405) 
+ .291DEMDEV74 - .199UNEMP75 
(.433) ( .689) 
1976 .52 AVGPAY76 = -54.717 + 19.211LOGPOP76 - 4.519LGREV76 
( 3.581) (19.341) 
- .326DEMDEV74 - .832UNEMP76 
(.423) ( .835) 
1977 .51 AVGPAY77 = -43.494 + 16.841LOGPOP77 + 1.124LGREV77 
( 3.813) (16.860) 
- .332DEMDEV76 - .316UNEMP77 
(.454) ( .851) 
1978 .41 AVGPAY78 = -31.234 + 14.897LOGPOP78 + 2.110LGREV78 
( 4.278) (18.951) 
+ .313DEMDEV76 - .770UNEMP78 
(.531) (1.008) 
1979 .45 AVGPAY79 = -34.961 + 16.997LOGPOP79 - 9.970LGREV79 
( 4.920) (18.520) 
+ .451DEMDEV78 + 1.224UNEMP79 
(.598) (1.028) 
1980 .45 AVGPAY80 = - 8.830 + 14.067LOGPOP80 - 11.690LGREV80 
( 5.328) (20.123) 
+ .869DEMDEV78 + .387UNEMP80 
(.624) ( .862) 
1981 .55 AVGPAY81 = -31.188 + 18.378LOGPOP81 - 14.115LGREV81 
( 4.679) (19.349) 
+ .773DEMDEV80 + .937UNEMP81 
(.479) ( .705) 
1982 .44 AVGPAY82 = 9.533 + 12.909LOGPOP82 
( 5.121) 
- 10.896LGREV82 
(16.480) 
+1.529DEMDEV80 - .292UNEMP82 
(.552) ( .669) 
Note: AVGPAY equals the average grant, see note to Table la for other variable names.
 
vo
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centage point increment in the unemployment rate accounts for a $1,16
 
fall-off of the average grant. All other years can be interpreted in
 
similar fashion.
 
Unfortunately, while much information is available from Tables la
 
and lb, the tables do not allow assessment of the relative impact of each
 
independent variable in comparison to the others. This is so because the
 
unit of measurement is different for each independent variable. For in
 
stance, revenue and population variations are expressed in logarithms to
 
the base ten, Democratic deviation is measured by percentage point devi
 
ations, and unemployment is measured in percentages. Moreover, the in
 
dependent variables do not vary over the same ranges.
 
In order to assess the relative impact of the independent variables,
 
it is necessary to express these variables in some standard unit. Fortuna
 
tely, such a unit of measurement is available. This unit is the standard
 
deviation. The standard deviation is a representation of the average
 
deviation of each observation from the mean of all observations. This
 
statistic makes variables comparable over all units of measurement. Thus,
 
a standard deviation increase in logged population is proportionately
 
equal to a standard deviation increment in Democratic deviation. The
 
standard deviations for all of the independent variables for all years
 
are given in Table 2.
 
Table 2 about here
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Using the standard deviations in Table 2, it is possible to cal
 
culate the amount of change in both cases per 10,000 and average grants
 
which will be produced by a standard deviation unit difference in each
 
of the independent variables, controlling for the others. These results
 
will be presented in Table 3.
 
Tables 3a and 3b about here
 
The units in Table 3a have been translated from logarithms back
 
into real numbers to improve interpretability. These numbers represent
 
orders of magnitude. For example, in 1974, a one standard deviation
 
change in the log of population equals an approximate doubling in the
 
number of cases per capita. By translating the standard deviation of the
 
log of population into real numbers as well (a .777 standard deviation
 
equals a 5.98 order of magnitude), the explanation is even more straight
 
forward: as population sextuples across counties, relief cases per capita
 
double. The explanation for Table 3b is less complex: all figures are
 
expressed in dollars.
 
In Table 3a population dominates all other variables in explanatory
 
power. The other independent variables do not have great impact until
 
1978 or 1979. Those years reflect the impact of Proposition 13 and the
 
state bailout. Some counties received more revenue per capita than other
 
counties from the state. The differences in revenue per county produced
 
by these events decreased the influence of population. Overall, the
 
effects are in the predicted direction, except for the unemployment vari­
TABLE 2
 
STANDARD DEVIATIONS FOR INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
 
Year Log 10 1/ Log 10 y Democratic Unemployment
 
Population Revenue Deviation Rate
 
1974 .777(3.98) .132(1.42) 3.492 3.230
 
1975 .773(5.96) .139(1.44) 3.118 3.353
 
1976 .774(3.94) .136(1.37) 3.118 2.792
 
1977 .771(3.90) .133(1.43) 4.477 2.923
 
1978 .766(3.83) .163(1.46) 4.477 2.672
 
1979 .762(3.78) .163(1.46) 4.439 2.747
 
1980 .762(3.78) .167(1.47) 4.439 3.089
 
1981 .760(3.73) .160(1.43) 4.918 3.612
 
1982 .739(3.74) .188(1.34) 4.918 4.324
 
1/ The figures in parentheses are the anti-logs of the standard deviations. In substantive terms, they
 
may be interpreted as orders of magnitude. In other words, in 1974 a .777 change in the log of population
 
is equivalent to a 598 percent adjustment in population.
 
TABLE 3
 
PREDICTED EFFECTS OF STANDARD DEVIATION CHANGES IN THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
 
3a: CASES PER 10,000
 
Year Logged Logged Democratic UnempIo]rment
 
Population Revenue Deviation Rate
 
Effect Effect Effect Effect
 
1974 1.98 1.17 1.26 (1.13)
 
1975 2.09 1.09 1.13 1.00
 
1976 2.02 1.05 1.06 (1.03)
 
1977 2.09 1.14 1.13 (1.16)
 
1978 1.98 1.33 1.17 (1.39)
 
1979 1.89 1.51 1.40 (1.30)
 
1980 1.84 1.33 1.35 (1.20)
 
1981 2.06 1.35 1.31 (1.04)
 
1982 1.76 1.25 1.36 (1.17)
 
Note: The figures in this table represent orders of magnitude. In other words, a one-standard deviation
 
change in any of the listed variables will produce a change in the dependent variable of the listed magnitude.
 
The figures in parentheses are reductions by an order of magnitude.
 
Ln
 
  
TABLE 3 (Cont.)
 
3b: AVERAGE GRANT
 
Year Logged Logged
 Democratic Unemployment

Population Revenue
 Deviation
 Rate
 
Effect
 Effect
 Effect
 Effect
 
1974 $ 8.27 $(3.89)
 $ 1.89 $(3.76)
 
1975 12.88 (1.89) (1.49) 
.67
 
1976 14.87 ( .61)
 (1.67) 2.32
 
1977 12.98 
.17
 (1.49)
 ( .92)
 
1978
 11.41
 
.34
 3.66
 2.06
 
1979 12.95 (1.65) 2.01
 3.36
 
1980 10.72 (1.95)
 3.87
 1.20
 
1981 13.97 (2.26)
 3.80
 3.38
 
1982 9.80 (2.05)
 7.52 (1.32)
 
Note: The figures in this table are in dollars and represent the predicted effects of a standard deviation
 
change in any of the listed variables. Parentheses indicate a negative effect of standard deviation change
 
in the listed variables.
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able. Surprisingly, worse economic conditions apparently decrease the
 
caseload rather than increase it.
 
Average grant (Table 3b) is also dominated by population. Other
 
independent variables are subject to frequent changes in sign which accent
 
the conclusions reached concerning population. Only after 1978 do the
 
variables show any consistency, and then only Democratic deviation in
 
1982 displays any effect comparable to population.
 
Until 1978, size of the county dominates the explanation of dif
 
ferences across counties for both the number of cases and the amount of
 
grant. With the impact of Proposition 13 other variables become more im
 
portant. Proposition 13 clearly made counties more sensitive to fluctua
 
tions in scarce revenue, economic well-being or the lack thereof, and the
 
political makeup of the county. But, this sensitivity appears to be more
 
closely related to caseload rather than the size of the grant. Counties
 
seem to reduce caseloads rather than cutting the size of the grants in
 
response to severe revenue shortages. Cutting caseloads appears to re
 
spond more directly to political pressures on the welfare system.
 
Unfortunately, the structural factors do not present the impact of
 
more immediate policy factors such as the restrictiveness of county wel
 
fare policy. Moreover, regression analysis does not really assess the
 
interrelationship between the independent variables. In order to disen
 
tangle all of these effects, a more sensitive technique, path analysis,
 
will be used in the next section.
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THE CAUSAL MODEL OF STRUCTURAL, POLITICAL^ AND POLICY FACTORS
 
In order to evaluate the causal model developed earlier in the
 
chapter, it is necessary to expand on the analysis of the previous section
 
and translate additional concepts and variables into indicators. To ach
 
ieve this translation, three major revisions are necessary in the original
 
hypotheses.
 
The first revision is the use of the unemployment rates to signify
 
economic conditions. Higher unemplojnnent rates actually indicate worse
 
economic conditions. Therefore, there are changes in sign for those re
 
lationships involving economic conditions.
 
The second major change is the specification of the relationships
 
among unemployment. Democratic deviation, and logged county revenue per
 
capita which were not specified in the original model. For this model,
 
the expectations are that higher unemployment rates will be associated
 
with higher Democratic deviations because of the Democratic party's tra
 
ditional concern for the jobless. The logged county revenue per capita
 
is expected to have a negative association with Democratic deviation be
 
cause richer counties are more likely to be conservative.^^®
 
130. Dye,"Politics, Economics, and the Public," pp. 238-259;
 
Dawson and Robinson, "The Politics of Welfare," and Tompkins, "A Causal
 
Model."
 
57 
Third, and last, the overall restrictiveness of the general relief
 
policies should be measured. Maximum grant per person per county is the
 
indicator that will be used. The other indicators such as property limi
 
tations and work restrictions showed little influence on either logged
 
cases per 10,000 or average grant in preliminary studies. Earlier
 
predictions suggested that the less restrictive the county the higher the
 
caseload and the lower the average grant. However, because maximum grant
 
is being used as a measure of restrictiveness the expectations are that
 
higher maximum grants will lead to both higher caseloads and higher average
 
grants.
 
The revised causal model is presented in Figure 2.
 
Figure 2 about here
 
The statistical technique most appropriate for separating the com
 
plicated relationships diagramed in Figure 2 is path analysis. Path
 
analysis achieves this separation by expressing each indicator in the
 
Figure 2
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system as a linear combination of indicators preceding it in the causal
 
model. Thus, each path analysis can be expressed as a series of struc
 
tural equations. For example, in Figure 2 there would be five structural
 
equations. The unemployment rate (Z2) would be predicted by logged popu
 
lation (Z]^) plus an error term. Logged revenue per capita (Z3) would be
 
an expression of the combined effects of logged population and the un­
emplojrment rate. Democratic deviation (Z4) would be a linear combina
 
tion of logged population, unemployment rate and logged revenue per capita.
 
Maximum grant (Z5) will be predicted by logged population, the unemploy
 
ment rate, logged revenue per capita, and Democratic deviation. Logged
 
cases per 10,000 and average grant (Z5) are formed by the combination of
 
the other five variables.
 
The coefficients produced by these structural equations are path
 
coefficients. These coefficients represent the direct effect of the pre
 
dictor indicator on the dependent indicator. What gives path analysis
 
its true interpretive power, however, is the ability it gives the re
 
searcher to combine these direct paths in order to assess the indirect
 
effects of other variables on the relationship under examination. In
 
other words, the influence of logged population on logged cases per 10,000
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can be measured directly by examining the path coefficient for that rela
 
tionship. In addition, it is possible to measure the indirect effect of
 
population on caseload by tracing the paths through unemployment rate,
 
logged county revenue. Democratic deviation, and maximum grant.
 
The complete path models for logged cases and average grants are
 
presented in Figures 3 and 4. The path coefficients in these diagrams
 
are standardized regression coefficients. That is to say, they are the
 
regression coefficients obtained when all indicators are expressed in
 
standard scores (the Z's in the structural equations in Figures 3 and
 
4).131 indicators U,V,W,X, and Y are residual terms representing
 
Figures 3 and 4 about here
 
131. A standard score is a subject's score on an indicator expressed
 
as a deviation from the mean of the indicator divided by the standard de
 
viation of the indicator. Indicators expressed in a standard score form
 
have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. This gives all in
 
dicators expressed in standard score form a common unit of measurement.
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the impact of unmeasured variables which have not been included in the
 
model•
 
Close examination of both figures reveals that the predicted signs
 
of some of the paths are not correct. The most significant error is the
 
path from population to revenue per capita. The prediction was that
 
larger counties would have higher revenue per capita. In fact, larger
 
counties have significantly lower revenue per capita. This suggests that
 
revenue does not increase as rapidly as population, and that larger
 
counties have much less flexibility in their revenue sources.
 
Similarly, it was hypothesized that higher unemployment rates would
 
lead to a larger number of cases per 10,000.1^^ The coefficients in
 
Figures 3 and 4 suggest, on the other hand, that higher unemployment rates
 
lead to lower cases. This implies that worsening economic conditions
 
induce the counties to restrict their caseloads and the size of their
 
grants rather than expand them in response to economic conditions. This
 
conclusion is reinforced by the negative path from unemployment rate to
 
maximum grant, i.e. higher unemployment rates lead to more restrictive
 
policies.
 
132. See pages 42 and 58.
 
133. See pages 42 and 58 .
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Several paths leading froin revenue per capita were also incorrectly
 
predicted• Higher revenue per capita was thought to lead to lower
 
pro-Democratic voting, but higher maximum grants. The opposite conclu
 
sions are supported. Counties with higher revenue per capita tend to
 
have higher Democratic deviation from the mean, and lower maximum grants.
 
Larger average grants were also expected to arise from higher revenue per
 
capita when, in fact, there is virtually no effect.
 
In general, revenue per capita and unemployment rates produce op
 
posite effects from those predicted by the model. Unfortunately, with
 
many paths it is often difficult to assess the relative influence of
 
several indicators. Path analysis does provide a mechanism for getting
 
around the problems caused by the complexity. It is possible to analyze
 
zero-order correlation coefficients and break them down into direct ef
 
fects due to the independent predictor under consideration and indirect
 
effects mediated through other indicators in the system.
 
For the models in Figures 3 and 4 the direct and indirect impact
 
of size on both caseload and average grant can be examined using this
 
method. More specifically, the correlation between logged population and
 
logged cases per 10,000 (r=.565) and the correlation between logged
 
134. See pages 42 and 58.
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population and average grant (r=.566) can be broken down into direct and
 
indirect paths.1^5 -j-jjis is done in Table 4.
 
Table 4 about here
 
135. 	The complete expansion is given by the following equations:
 
1^61 = 	1*61 + ^ 62^21 + P63P3I + P63P32P2I + P64P4I + ^ 64^42^21 +
 
P64P43P3I + ^ 64^43^32^21 + ^ 65^51 + ^ 63^52^21 + ^ 65^53^31 +
 
P63P53P32P2I + P63P34P4I + P63P34P42P2I + P63P34P43P3I +
 
P63P34^43P32P21­
The term Pgj! represents the direct effect of population on either caseload
 
or average grant. All terms beginning with P52 represent the indirect
 
effects of size as channeled through county unemployment rates. The terms
 
beginning with P53 compose the indirect effects of population as trans
 
mitted by revenue per capita. The indirect effects of population adjusted
 
for the Democratic deviation of the county is the sum of all paths beginning
 
with P64. Finally, the terms containing P55 signify the indirect effects
 
of population as transferred through maximum grant.
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TABLE 4
 
DIRECT AND INDIRECT EFFECTS OF LOGGED COUNTY POPULATION
 
ON LOGGED CASES PER 10,000 AND AVERAGE GRANT
 
a. Logged Cases per 10,000
 
Direct effect:
 
Logged Population .461
 
Indirect effect through:
 
Unemplojrment Rate .077
 
Logged Revenue Per Capita -.137
 
Democratic Deviation .060
 
Maximum Grant .101
 
Total Indirect .101
 
Correlation Between Logged Population and
 
Logged Cases .565^
 
b. Average General Relief Grant
 
Direct effect:
 
Logged Population .270
 
Indirect effect through:
 
Unemployment Rate .019
 
Logged Revenue Per Capita .016
 
Democratic Deviation .060
 
Maximum Grant .199
 
Total Indirect .294
 
Correlation Between Logged Population and
 
Average Grant .566*
 
*Direct and Indirect effects do not sum because of rounding error.
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Several conclusions can be drawn from the table. The direct impact
 
of logged population is greater on logged cases per 10,000 than on aver
 
age grant. Correspondingly, the indirect effects through the other in^
 
dicators are much larger on average grant. However, this conclusion is
 
a little deceptive. Closer examination of the indirect effects reveals
 
a remarkable disparity between the two indicators.
 
Looking first at the impact of population on cases, it is clear
 
that each of the other indicators has a substantial effect. Population
 
as mediated through unemployment rate has a positive influence on the
 
number of cases. Democratic deviation and maximum grant also increase
 
the correlation between logged population and logged cases. On the other
 
hand, the mediating effect of logged revenue serves to substantially
 
reduce the correlation. As a result, the net indirect effect is much
 
smaller than might be anticipated.
 
The indirect effects of size on average grant are very different.
 
Unemplo3rment and logged revenue per capita have virtually no mediating
 
influence. The most powerful intermediary effects are those of maximum
 
grant and Democratic deviation. In fact, virtually all of the indirect
 
effects are accounted for by these two indicators.
 
Substantively, Table 4 suggests some interesting conclusions.
 
First, the addition of maximum grant to the equations clearly increases
 
the explanatory power of the models over those specified in the previous
 
section. The mediating effects of maximum grant are strong for both
 
dependent indicators. This implies that the addition of more immediate
 
policy factors to a model including structural factors may well improve
 
the accuracy of prediction.
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Second, the structural factors do not have the same impact for
 
logged cases and average grant. In the regression equations derived for
 
the structural indicators in the previous section, the economic and
 
financial factors had more influence on logged cases per 10,000 than on
 
average grant. This conclusion is supported by the data in Table 4. The
 
correlation between logged population and logged cases is distinctly more
 
sensitive to variations in unemplojrment rate and logged revenue per capita
 
than is the correlation between logged population and average grant.
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
 
This chapter has attempted to clarify the forces affecting county
 
general relief policies in California. Because general relief programs
 
are county-funded and county-administered, there is a wide variation in
 
programs across counties. Even so, the counties share certain struc
 
tural constraints and policy restrictions. A county's relief policies
 
will be affected by its population, its economic conditions, its finan
 
cial solvency, and its political biases. The policies will also be
 
affected by the number of restrictions placed on eligibility and the size
 
of the grant.
 
When these, relationships are tested empirically, certain patterns
 
emerge. Differences in population clearly dominate differences in relief
 
outputs. Within that context, caseloads appear to be more sensitive to
 
136. See Appendix B.
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financial and economic differences among counties. Average grants, on
 
the other hand, show little sensitivity to economic and financial fac
 
tors. Both policy outcomes appear to be sensitive to political differ
 
ences and differences in policy restrictiveness. This suggests an in
 
teresting conclusion. Counties seem to respond to difference in economic
 
strength and financial well-being by manipulating the size of the case
 
load rather than the size of the grant. In other words, the most poli
 
tically viable alternative for county administrators faced with poorer
 
economies and revenue shortfalls is the reduction of the general relief
 
rolls.
 
This conclusion, however, should be reached with some care. Much
 
of this analysis has been based on cross-sectional data. It is risky to
 
draw time-based conclusions from such a data set. To evaluate the impact
 
of long-term fluctuations in structural and policy variables a time-series
 
analysis is necessary. Such an analysis, aggregated to the state level,
 
is presented in the next chapter.
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Chapter 3
 
LONGITUDINAL STUDY OF GENERAL RELIEF
 
Introduction
 
This chapter focuses on structural, political, and policy factors
 
which produce changes over time in aggregate county general relief policies
 
(i.e. county general relief cases and county-funded payments combined
 
across all 58 counties). However, because the focus of the study has
 
shifted from explanation of difference across individual counties to
 
explanations of state-level differences across years, the theoretical
 
model must be respecified.
 
The next section describes the theoretical model in some detail.
 
The structural, political and policy variables are redefined to take into
 
account the fact that the data concern changes in aggregate county gen
 
eral relief policy at the state level, and not differences in policy
 
across counties.
 
The indicators used to identify policy changes are total county
 
general relief cases per 1,000 population for the period 1951 through
 
1982, general relief payments per capita expressed in 1967 dollars, and
 
relief payments per case adjusted for inflation. Data on these measures
 
are presented in figures 5, 6, and 7. The factors hypothesized to produce
 
137. This data is drawn from the 1982 Public Welfare in Califor
 
nia previously cited.
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variations in these measures across time are economic (unemployment rate),
 
political (Democratic or Republican control of the state government), and
 
policy-oriented (major changes in state welfare policy or financial
 
structure in 1957, 1965, 1971, and 1978). Population and county re
 
venue are not relevant since all data is aggregated by counties to the
 
state level.
 
The statistical model used to analyze each of the three measures
 
of relief policy change is time-series regression. The time-series re
 
gression model is simply multiple regression applied to cases which re
 
present time periods. The section on the statistical model describes the
 
model in more detail for all three of the measures of general relief.
 
The findings are discussed in some detail. Then, the possibility that
 
different policy changes cause welfare administrators to react differ
 
ently to changes in unemployment rate and party control of the state
 
government is considered. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion
 
of the time-series analysis.
 
138. These policy changes are given in more detail in the next
 
section.
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THEORETICAL MODEL
 
The conceptual model presented in Chapter 2 provides a convenient
 
starting point for analyzing cross-time changes. In general, aggregate
 
relief policies would be expected to respond to such structural factors
 
as the economic condition and political makeup of the state. By con
 
trast, since changes across time are little influenced by factors which
 
explain differences across counties, size and financial conditions will
 
have little impact. Both variables, and their respective indicators,
 
population and county revenue from all sources, are subject to incremental
 
growth when examined over any period of time. This incremental growth,
 
which is highly correlated with time, is difficult to interpret in a time-"
 
series context.
 
General relief policies should also be expected to respond to more
 
direct policy factors. Such policy factors would include any major changes
 
in the general welfare structure of the state. Policy changes by the
 
state will profoundly affect eligibility requirements and maximum grants
 
at the county level.
 
To develop these relationships and to lay the groundwork for the
 
empirical analysis, the variables must be operationalized. For this study
 
the impact of the independent variables will be examined on three differ
 
ent indicators of changes in relief policy. The first will be cases per
 
1,000 population. The adjustment for population is made to minimize the
 
influence of population increases in California. Data for the period
 
1951 to 1982 are shown in Figure 5. The second indicator is general
 
relief payments per capita expressed in 1967 dollars. The indicator re­
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moves the effects of both inflation and population increases. Relief
 
payments per capita for the period 1951 to 1982 are presented in Figure
 
6. The third, and perhaps most important, indicator is relief payments
 
per case adjusted for inflation. This indicator should be sensitive to
 
changes in welfare philosophy at the county level. This is to say, by
 
comparing the impact of the independent variables on cases per 1,000 and
 
relief pa3nnents per case, aii assessment of the relative priorities of the
 
county relief system ought to be possible. Relief payments per case are
 
sunnnarized in Figure 7.
 
Figures 5y 6, and 7 about here
 
If economic condition is measured using the yearly California unem­
plojnnent rate over the period of the study, then the following relation
 
ships should hold. As unemployment increases (i.e. as the economy wor
 
sens), the number of cases per 1,000 should increase. Similarly, unem
 
ployment increases should lead to increases in both relief pa)rments per
 
capita and relief payments per case as demands oh the relief system in
 
crease.
 
Democratic control of the state government will produce higher
 
caseloads and higher relief pa)rments (whether measured against population
 
or cases). Mixed control should produce lower overall averages on all
 
three indicators. Republican control would be expected to result in the
 
lowest figures of the three types of control.
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Four major welfare policy changes in California are likely to show
 
the greatest impact of all available policy factors. The first is the
 
package of reforms passed by the 1957 legislature. These laws increased
 
the number of welfare programs and expanded grant structures. Though not
 
directly affected by the state laws, the counties liberalized general
 
relief policies. Therefore, one would expect to find increases in county
 
caseload and relief payments beginning in 1958.
 
The second major policy change was the passage by the federal govern
 
ment of the various War on Poverty programs. The adoption of these pro
 
grams by California in 1965 changed the welfare structure in the state.
 
Two changes in particular seem relevant to county relief policies. First,
 
the wide variety of federal programs allowed the temporary transfer of
 
many general relief recipients to state and federal programs. Second,
 
and more importantly, the Great Society produced a more liberal welfare
 
philosophy than in the past. Thus, it became much easier in the long run
 
to receive welfare at all levels. In statistical terms, the adoption of
 
these changes should be reflected in an immediate drop in general relief
 
caseload followed by a rapid increase. Relief payments for those remain
 
ing on general relief should increase dramatically since relief funds
 
would already be allocated.
 
The third policy alteration impacting on county general relief pro
 
grams was the 1971 Welfare Reform Act. In response to rapidly expand
 
ing caseloads and expenditures at both the state and county levels,
 
Governor Ronald Reagan proposed, and the California legislature approved,
 
major changes in the state welfare laws. The primary focus of these
 
reforms was the reduction of the caseloads of state-mandated programs.
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The grants were to remain the same or increase. Because state programs 
are administered by the counties, these changes were carried oVer to 
county general relief programs as well. Therefore, an examination of 
general relief cases and relief payments after 1971 should show a dra 
matic drop in cases per 1,000 and either no drop or an increase in re 
lief payments per case. 
The final modification in state policy which had a significant 
effect on county relief policy was the passage of Proposition 13 in 1978. 
Since most counties rely heavily on the property tax for revenue, the 
passage of the proposition effectively reduced available funds for county 
programs. While the state provided temporary bailout money to most coun 
ties, the counties responded in the long run by drastically restricting 
their general relief programs. Thus, relief cases and relief payments 
after 1979 should show some decrease. 
STATISTICAL MODEL 
The statistical technique which will be used to assess the rela 
tionships discussed in the previous section is again multiple regression. 
Unlike the structural regressions presented in Chapter 2, the cases will 
represent the years 1951 through 1982. Thus, the analysis will be based 
on 32 cases. There is, however, an additional complication which arises 
from the use of multiple regression techniques on time-series data. This 
problem is autocorrelation. The regression model assumes that the forces 
influencing one observation are not the same forces influencing a subse 
quent observation (i.e. the error in predicting the first observation is 
not related to the error in predicting the second observation). Since 
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the cases in a time-series are time periods, forces affecting one time
 
period are very likely to influence the subsequent time periods, thus
 
violating the regression model. In order to deal with the possibility
 
of autocorrelation an additional statistic, the Durbin-Watson statistic,
 
which tests for autocorrelation, will be presented.
 
The indicators to be used in this analysis are presented below:
 
Yi = General relief cases per 1,000 population.
 
Y2 = General relief payments per capita (real dollars),
 
Y3 = General relief payments per case (real dollars).
 
= State Unemplo3nnent rate by year.
 
Dj = Democratic control of state government.
 
D2 = Mixed control of state government.
 
Ej = Passage of 1957 welfare reforms.
 
E2 = Adoption of 1965 Great Society programs.
 
E3 = Passage of 1971 welfare reforms.
 
E4 = Passage of Proposition 13 in 1978.
 
The Y indicators are the dependent variables in the regression
 
analysis. X, D, and E, are the independent indicators. The unemploy
 
ment rate (Xj) is a continuous indicator. By contrast, D and E are sets
 
of dummy indicators. Each indicator is coded "1" for the presence of and
 
"0" for the absence of the influence. Note that for both sets of indica
 
tors there is one less indicator than there are categories. In parti
 
cular, there is no indicator for Republican control and no indicator for
 
the period prior to the 1957 welfare reforms. This is necessary for the
 
regression model to work. The presence of Republican control is indicated
 
by the absence of both Democratic and mixed control. The same is true
 
for the seven years prior to 1958. The inclusion of indicators for these
 
categories would be statistically redundant.
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The results of the regressions of the three indicators Yj, Y2, and
 
Y3 on the set of independent indicators are presented in the equations
 
below:
 
Yi = 3.226 + .257X - .930Di - .32202 + .705Ei - I.64OE2
 
(.086) (.327) (.355) (.413) (.390)
 
-2.202E3 - 2.9IOE4; r2 = .889; d = 1.371.
 
(.538) (.537)
 
Y2 = 1.075 + .139Xi - .35801".04802 - .143Ei - •528E2
 
(.040) (.152) (.165) (.192) (.181)
 
- .246E3 - .8IOE4; r2 = .722; d = 1.251.
 
(.250) (.250)
 
Y3 = 363.470 + 5.342X1 + 10.889O1 + 5.82102 - 93.558Ei
 
(5.889) (22.361) (24.230) (24.231)
 
+ 51.426E2 + 296.714E3 + 303.6I6E4; r2 = .972; d = 1.851
 
(26.640) (36.772) (36.698)
 
The Y in each equation represents the predicted Y from the regression
 
equation rather than the observed Y. The r2 is the coefficient of de
 
termination and represents the percentage of the variation in each de
 
pendent indicator explained by all of the independent indicators. The d
 
value is the Ourbin-Watson statistic. In order to conclusively state
 
that there is autocorrelation the d must be less than .98 for this num
 
ber of independent indicators. In order to conclusively state that there
 
is no autocorrelation the d must be larger than 2.01. Unfortunately, all
 
three values fall in the inconclusive range. However, it can be shown
 
algebraically that positive autocorrelation, (the most frequent kind)
 
biases the standard errors (the figures in parenthesis) rather than the
 
slope coefficients. This means that the standard errors will generally
 
be too small and the researcher can oyer-estimate the significance of
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the relationship. The slope coefficients, on the other hand, can be used
 
as calculated, but with extreme care.
 
Recalling that the slope coefficients can be interpreted as the
 
amount of change in the dependent indicator produced by a one-unit change
 
in the independent indicator controlling for the other indicators in the
 
equations, the equations can now be discussed. Looking first at the re
 
gression equation for cases per 1,000, a number of interesting facts are
 
apparent. Controlling for the impact of the political and policy factors,
 
the relationship between increases in unemployment rate and relief cases
 
per 1,000 is positive as predicted. A one-percentage point increase in
 
the rate of unemployment produces a .257 increase in the number of relief
 
cases per 1,000 or about one-quarter of one case. Since unemployment
 
ranged over a six-percentage point span, the number of relief cases per
 
1,000 varied by as much as one and one-half cases, almost one-third of
 
the total range in the dependent indicator.
 
The impact of the political factors is much more surprising, however.
 
Democratic control of the state government was expected to lead to in
 
creases in caseload. In fact, the opposite is apparently the case. The
 
average number of relief cases per 1,000 during Democratic administra
 
tions is .930 cases lower than under Republican administrations, even ad
 
justing for differences in unemployment arid policy environment. Mixed
 
control produces a higher average than Democratic control, but even this
 
average is .322 cases below the Republican average.
 
The strongest influences appear to rise from the policy factors.
 
In general, the coefficients adhere to expectations. Adjusting for the
 
effects of unemployment and political administration, the 1957 welfare
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reforms produce a .705 case increase over the average number of relief
 
cases during the 1951 to 1957 period. The subsequent policy changes pro
 
duce substantial drops in relief cases per 1,000 over the 1951 - 1957
 
period. Moreover, each policy change represents a substantial drop in
 
caseload over the previous policy change. The War on Poverty changes
 
reduce the average general relief caseload per 1,000 by over 2.3 cases
 
(from .705 cases higher than 1951 - 1957 to 1.640 cases lower than 1951
 
-1957). The 1971 welfare reforms dropped the caseload an additional
 
.562 cases to 2.202 cases below the 1951 - 1957 average. Finally, Pro
 
position 13 reduces caseload still further to 2.910 below the 1951 - 1957
 
average.
 
The impact of the economic, political, and policy factors on total
 
relief payments per capita is very similar. The effect of unemplo3nnent
 
rate is again positive, producing a $.139 increase in total relief per
 
capita for every one-percentage point increase in unemployment rate. The
 
influence of Democratic control of state government is again negative,
 
reducing average relief payments by $.358 over Republican control. In
 
terms of the policy factors, the highest average relief payments per
 
capita occur in the 1951 - 1957 period prior to any major policy change.
 
All subsequent policy changes produced lower average payments per capita.
 
Only the coefficients for 1971 represent an increase over the previous
 
time period, and, even then the figure is still below the 1951 - 1957
 
average.
 
Relief payments per capita can be viewed as total available relief
 
revenue adjusted for population. In this sense, it represents a rela
 
tively fixed source of relief. On the other hand, relief payments per
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case represent that total available relief divided among the eligible
 
cases. Therefore, dramatically different effects of the independent
 
indicators on relief per case are not surprising. The influence of
 
unemployment rate is positive. It increases relief per case by $5,342
 
for every one-percentage point increase in unemplo3^ent. However, since
 
these payments vary from approximately $296.00 per year to approximately
 
$764.00 per year, the effect of unemployment is not very significant.
 
The political influences are equally weak. A Democratic administration
 
and a Democratic legislature only increase relief per case by $10,889
 
over a Republican controlled government. Mixed control only increases
 
relief per case by $5,821 over Republican control. The really powerful
 
influences are those of the policy factors. Contrary to earlier expec
 
tations, the 1957 welfare reforms dramatically reduce relief payments per
 
case (by $93,558 over the 1951 - 1957 period). By contrast, the 1965 and
 
1971 policy changes increase relief per case as expected. Surprisingly,
 
the average relief payment per case after Proposition 13 is slightly
 
higher (by about $7.00) than the same pajrment in the 1972 - 1978 period.
 
Before these results are summarized, however, a note of caution is
 
in order. None of the regression equations account for possible inter
 
action among the economic, political, and policy factors. That is, it
 
is entirely possible that unemployment rate will affect each measure of
 
general relief differently for each political change or each policy change.
 
Normally, this possibility can be assessed by adding interaction terms
 
representing all possible combinations of the indicators to each regres
 
sion equation. But, because the R^ in each equation is so high, the
 
addition of interaction terms causes distorted results. Therefore, the
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regression equations for the time periods between each policy change must
 
be examined separately. The results for each dependent indicator are
 
presented in Tables 5, 6, and 7. Because party control is different
 
within each time period, the indicators used in each will vary.
 
Tables, 5, 6, and 7 about here
 
The segmented regression equations reveal patterns which are ob-^
 
scared in the more general equations. In particular, the influences of
 
unemployment rate and party control on relief cases per 1,000 (Table 5)
 
and relief payments per capita (Table 6) appear to be strongest in the
 
periods following the adoption of the Great Society programs and the 1971
 
welfare reforms. In addition, unemployment rate, considered by itself,
 
seems to put more upward pressure on relief caseload than on total relief
 
payments. The impact of Democratic control remains negative regardless
 
of time period.
 
Table 7 reveals even stronger differences. In the general equation
 
describing relief payments per case, the coefficient for unemployment
 
rate is positive. When this equation is broken down into time periods,
 
the relationship is negative in all periods but the period from 1965 to
 
1971. That is to say, for most of the period from 1951 to 1982, increases
 
in unemployment rate lead to reductions in relief payments per case. The
 
impact of party control is basically insignificant except during the
 
period 1972 to 1978 where the average payment increases by $89.46 in the
 
transition from Governor Ronald Reagan (R) to Governor Edmund G. Brown,
 
Jr. (D).
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Table 5
 
REGRESSION OF RELIEF CASES PER 1,000 ON UNEMPLOYMENT RATE
 
AND PARTY CONTROL, CONTROLLING FOR TIME PERIOD*
 
1951 
- 1957
 
f
 
Yl = 1.499
 
(.549)'
 
. 1958 - 1964
 
pi f. = 3.734
 
(.373) (.633)'
 
|i ■ 
1965 •
- 1971 
i '!
 
.755 +
pi =
 (.103) (.333) (.296)'
 
i 1972 -
- 1978
 
l i 1
 
1.144 •
pi =
 
(.086) (.181)'
 
Iil979 -
- 1982
 
|Yi = 1.432 - .015X1; = -013
 
(.090)
 
*The period from 1951 - 1957 was a period of solely Republican control.
 
The period from 1958 - 1964 was a period during which control shifted
 
from Republicans to Democrats. The segment, 1965 - 1971, showed all three
 
patterns of party control(including mixed). The time period, 1972 - 1978,
 
was a period of mixed and Democratic control. Finally, the period 1979
 
- 1982 was dominated by Democrats.
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Table 6
 
REGRESSION OF RELIEF PAYMENTS PER CAPITA ON UNEMPLOYMENT RATE
 
AND PARTY CONTROL, CONTROLLING FOR TIME PERIOD*
 
1951 - 1957
 
Y2 =1.101 + .132Xi; r2 = .083
 
(.196)
 
1958 - 1964
 
Y2 * 1.674 - .009X2" -19502; = -214
 
(.113) (.191)
 
1965 - 1971
 
Y2 = -.221 + .278X2 - .50402 - .16502; r2= .940
 
(.056) (.182) (.163)
 
1972 - 1978
 
Y2 = 1.086 + .091X2 - .I8ID2; r2 = .501
 
(.049) (.103)
 
1979 - 1982
 
Y2 = 1.157 - .028X2; = .103
 
(.058)
 
♦The period from 1951 - 1957 was a period of solely Republican control. 
The period from 1958 - 1964 was a period during which control shifted 
from Republicans to Democrats. The segment, 1965 - 1971, showed all three 
patterns of party control ( including mixed). The time period, 1972 - 1978, 
was a period of mixed and Democratic control. Finally, the period 1979 
- 1982 was dominated by Democrats. 
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Table 7
 
REGRESSION OF RELIEF PAYMENTS PER CASE ON UNEMPLOYMENT RATE
 
AND PARTY CONTROL, CONTROLLING FOR TIME PERIOD*
 
1951 - 1957
 
Y3 =505.113 - 28.848Xi; r2 » .591
 
(10.727)
 
1958 - 1964
 
Y3 = 416.521 - 16.333X1"9.5llDi; r2 = .629
 
(6.375) (10.667)
 
1965 - 1971
 
Y3 = 313.534 + 20.929Xi -8.75801 + :30.978D2; R^ = .796
 
(9.195) (29.816) (26.502)
 
1972-1978
 
Y3 =845.552 - 22.978X1 + 89.464Di; r2 = .940
 
(5.436) (11.398)
 
1979 - 1982
 
Y3 = 815.806 - 12.974X1; r2 = .685
 
(6.217)
 
*The period from 1951 - 1957 was a period of solely Republican control.
 
The period from 1958 - 1964 was a period during which control shifted
 
from Republicans to Democrats. The segment,1965 - 1971, showed all three
 
patterns of party control(including mixed). The time period, 1972 - 1978,
 
was a period of mixed and Democratic control. Finally, the period 1979
 
— 1982 was dominated by Democrats.
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
 
The statistical models discussed in the previous section reveal
 
several things about how counties in the aggregate respond to state-level
 
changes in economic conditionj political makeup, and policy environment.
 
First, the regression equations suggest that, overall, California coun
 
ties tend to view relief policy as a zero-sum game. Total relief rev
 
enue combined across counties appears to be relatively insensitive to all
 
but major policy changes. Caseload, on the other hand, responds not only
 
to policy factors but to economic and political factors as well. In com
 
bination, these influences produce the following results: if changes in
 
the unemplo}rment rate or control of state government force the relief
 
caseload to rise, the average amount of money that the county gives to
 
each recipient drops. Conversely, if political and economic changes force
 
the caseload downward, relief payments per case rise. In general, this
 
oscillating effect implies two things. It suggests that counties view
 
total general relief as a fixed entity. It also indicates that counties
 
tend to react to external factors such as changes in unemplojrment rate,
 
political control, and state welfare law rather than act independently.
 
The only exception to this pattern is the period from 1965 to 1971.
 
The adoption of the War on Poverty program, while it temporarily reduced
 
relief caseloads, unleashed expansionary pressures in the relief system.
 
Only during this period did caseload, total relief payments, and relief
 
per case increase simultaneously. This signifies a major, albeit tem
 
porary, change in welfare philosophy. The coincident increase of all
 
relief measures indicates that the fixed approach to relief policy was
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briefly abandoned. However, the consequent rise in both state and county
 
welfare expenditures produced a rapid political backlash. The 1971 Wel
 
fare Reform Act was the result.
 
The final point which can be derived from the equations is the over
 
whelming influence of state-level policy changes on county-level deci
 
sions. When the policy changes are controlled for by dividing the regres
 
sions into time periods, the remaining indicators rarely account for as
 
much of the variance as the general equations do. Clearly, county wel
 
fare administrators and county boards of supervisors are highly sensi
 
tive to policy changes at the state level. Even when the changes have
 
bearing only on state programs administered by the county, counties gen
 
erally bring their own programs into conformity with state programs. This
 
produces an interesting paradox. While county general relief programs
 
vary widely in their eligibility, economic and work requirements, the net
 
result of changes in those policies over time appears to bring them more
 
into conformity with external state conditions. In other words, they
 
maintain their uniqueness with regard to other counties but react quickly
 
to changes in overall state-wide conditions.
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Chapiter 4
 
CONCLUSION: RETURN TO THE POOR LAW
 
Counties have accepted the responsibility for caring for the des
 
titute. However, their programs vary widely. While some counties feel
 
that their responsibility ends with minimal help to the recipient, others
 
open their treasuries enough to feed and house the poor. Yet, even the
 
most liberal counties (San Francisco and Santa Barbara) provide aid which
 
leaves recipients below the poverty level. Moreover, all counties are
 
basically restrictive.
 
Counties still place the poor in categories. There are "deserving"
 
and "non-deserving" poor. By most standards, only the "able-bodied" are
 
eligible for relief. Transients, hobos, alcoholics, and, as a Sacramento
 
judge put it, the "unwashed" are unworthy of aid.^^^ Those without street
 
addresses are unable to receive help in most counties. A welfare offi
 
cial who shall remain anonymous, stated to this author that no one slept
 
in the streets in her county despite abundant evidence to the contrary.
 
Categorization has been perpetuated and becomes more apparent in times
 
of high unemplojrment.
 
Furthermore, county residency requirements are perpetuated. For
 
most counties these requirements are limited to proof of intent to remain
 
in the county. However, some counties have stricter residency require­
139. "The State," Los Angeles Times 102 (April 4, 1983), Part 1,
 
p. 2.
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ments. The Poor Laws stated that the vagrant, or the stranger who was a
 
potential vagrant, should be put out of the town without being helped.
 
This type of thinking continues unchanged in some of the county general
 
relief policies even if the cities in California are not walled. If one
 
must have a residence in order to get aid but have no funds to rent a
 
room, then the needy person is caught in an endless, downward spiral.
 
Because county resources are scarce it is also possible that coun
 
ties will again try to find relatives who are able to support their poorer
 
relations and reimburse the counties for aid expenditures. The Governor
 
of California is already suggesting this approach for state medical aid
 
reimbursement.
 
Virtually all counties impose work requirements of some kind. Some
 
counties require recipients to work directly for their aid. Other juris
 
dictions expect grantees to register with the California State Employ
 
ment Development Department and conduct an active job search. Still other
 
counties do not have their own work programs, but coordinate work pro
 
grams with other institutions. Regardless of the type of program, how
 
ever, it is clear that most counties believe the aid must be earned.
 
The most extreme return to restrictive principles is the re­
establishment of the poorhouse in Sacramento County. During the incep
 
tion of the Poor Laws and even into the 18th century in the United States,
 
poorhouses were used to help the poor correct problems which were con
 
sidered of their own making. This new poorhouse seems to return to the
 
thinking that the poor are responsible for their Own problems. On the
 
15th of April, 1983, the first in what promises to be a long series of
 
legal decisions on the Sacramento County poorhouse will be handed down.
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This is the day that the judge of the Superior Court of the State of
 
California is to rule on the constitutionality of the poorhouse. If the
 
poorhouse is deemed legal, it is possible that other counties will in
 
stitute poorhouses to contain the very poorest of the able-bodied.
 
Actually, county general relief policy has changed little since the
 
1850's. With statehood and the settling of California by the white
 
Europeans, the modified poor laws were instituted. The argument that the
 
philosophies of that time continue today is supported by history. Fur­
' I
 
thermore, this study of general relief provides evidence of the use of
 
the Poor Law philosophy on current-day county general relief programs.
 
In general, relief policy is restrictive. It is designed inten
 
tionally to exclude certain classifications of individuals. However, the
 
counties also appear to respond to changes in economic, financial, and
 
political context. When resources appear scarce, the programs for the
 
poor are restricted. When these resources are perceived to be plentiful,
 
the programs are liberalized.
 
The cross-sectional study completed in Chapter 2 suggests that there
 
are differences in the way in which county general relief programs across
 
' , , ■ ' - ' ■ ' ■ ■ / 
the 58 counties respond to external changes. For example, these programs 
are sensitive to the size of the county. The larger the county the less 
restrictive its program will be. The smaller the county, the more res 
trictive the general relief program. That is to say, the maximum grant 
in larger counties would be more than the maximum grant available in coun 
ties with a smaller population. 
Economic and financial restrictions tend to affect the size of the
 
caseload rather than the amount of the grant. As these conditions tend
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to be cyclical in nature, caseload is allowed to grow during the 'good*
 
times and is contracted during the 'bad' times. Although this is under
 
standable from a county government point of view, it seems that more
 
people need general relief and are unable to qualify for it during the
 
'bad' times•
 
Counties that are less restrictive in their policy requirements
 
(such as those for eligibility) have larger caseloads and higher grants
 
than other counties. These are also the counties with a greater popu
 
lation. The large counties, by virtue of their size, have a greater
 
demand placed on them for help by those needing general relief.
 
The evidence presented in the longitudinal study (Chapter 3) sug
 
gests that general relief is a zero-sum game. Major policy changes that
 
increase the size of grants reduce caseload or vice versa. Only during
 
the Great Society era (programs accepted by California in 1965) did both
 
the caseload and grants increase for a short time. There was a feeling
 
throughout the nation during this time that there was plenty for everybody
 
and that resources were unlimited. By 1971, California state realized
 
that its welfare programs cost more than available funds allowed for.
 
The backlash produced restrictions which were placed on recipients of
 
welfare. This reduced the caseloads. However, grants remained large
 
and, in some instances, actually increased.
 
In summary, both studies suggest that counties in California re
 
spond to policy changes at the state level. Economic conditions do not
 
trickle down but are rather abruptly perceived in county general relief
 
programs. At the same time, rises in the unemplojnnent rate makes coun
 
ties more aware of their available revenue. They realize that the rise
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in unemployment rates means fewer dollars in the county treasury. There
 
fore, the county will restrict general relief programs and will make a
 
greater distinction between the "deserving" and the "non-deserving" poor.
 
This alone will restrict county caseload.
 
As long as restrictive philosophy is the dominant thinking in the
 
counties, categorization, residency requirements, poorhouse use, and pos
 
sible relative responsibility will remain in force. In the author's
 
opinion, the use of this philosophy does not aid the poor in becoming
 
upstanding citizens in their communities but will tend to push people
 
down into poverty. Although such revolutionary thinking probably will
 
not replace current welfare law, it would seem that all of the so-called
 
poor deserve real help, even the homeless.
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APPENDIX A
 
THE QUESTIONNAIRE
 
The 	telephone survey of all 58 counties in California was conduc
 
ted 	during December 1982 and January 1983. Welfare departments were
 
contacted and the following questions were asked concerning their gen
 
eral relief programs. The length of the average interview was seven
 
minutes.
 
1. 	Considering a one person household, what is the
 
maximum grant available?
 
2. 	Are grants paid by check, cash or voucher system?
 
3. 	What are your residency requirements?
 
4. 	Does your county have a work program for the able-

bodied? Please explain - for instance, is a job
 
search conducted and are grants to be worked off
 
before they are given to a recipient?
 
5. 	What are the upper limits on liquid assets, personal
 
property, real property and automobiles that can be
 
retained by an applicant for general relief and still
 
qualify for aid?
 
6. 	Do you consider general relief to be an outright gift
 
or a loan in your county? Do you take a lien on real
 
property?
 
It should be noted that telephone surveys were conducted in 36 of the
 
counties. Only Nevada and Trinity counties required letters which they
 
subsequently answered.^
 
1. See Appendix C for a further discussion of Trinity county.
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APPENDIX B
 
THE RESULTS OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE
 
The results of the telephone survey were varied and interesting.
 
The various headings I have used need some further clarification.
 
One Person - Maximum grant available for one able-bodied person
 
living alone. Grant amounts are for one month periods.
 
Personal Property - In some counties personal property and
 
liquid assets were defined as the same thing.
 
Other differences across counties are explained in the notes at
 
the end of this appendix.
 
It should be noted that most counties had some type of transient
 
program which 1 have not attempted to explain.
 
GENERAL RELIEF TELEPHONE QUESTIONNAIRE OF ALL COUNTY WELFARE DEPARTMENTS IN CALIFORNIA 
COUNTY ONE 
PERSON 
TYPE PAID BY RESIDENCY 
REQUIREMENT 
WORK 
PROG. 
LIMITS OF QUALIFICATION 
CASH PERS. AUTO HOME 
PROP. 
LIEN 
ON 
HOME 
Alameda $200.00 Grant Cash Intent to 
Stay 
yes $ 50. $1,500. Exempt W 
Alpine AS NEEDED no no 
Amador 73.50 Grant Voucher Intent no NO DEFINED LIMITS no 
Butte 160.00 Loan Cash Intent 
yes 
600. 1,500. $1,500. no 
Calaveras 40.00+ 
Util. 
Grant Cash h.! no 500. 700. 2,000. no 
Colusa AS NEEDED (Pay rent and utilities and food) no NO DEFINED LIMITS no 
Contra Costa 160.00 Loan Voucher Intent yes -0- 4./ 
1,500. 
Exempt 
DelNorte 186.00 Loan Voucher Intent yes $ 50. 1,500. Exempt yes 
Eldorado 91.00 Loan Voucher Intent u 
yes 
-0- 500. 2,000. Exempt yes 
I 
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 GENERAL RELIEF TELEPHONE QUESTIONNAIRE OF ALL COUNTY WELFARE DEPARTMENTS IN CALIFORNIA
 
LIMITS OF QUALIFICATION
 LIEN
 
COUNTY ONE
 TYPE PAID BY
 RESIDENCY WORK CASH PERS. AUTO HOME
 ON
 
PERSON
 REQUIREMENT PROG.
 PROP.
 HOME
 
Fresno $248.00 Loan Voucher Intent yes $1,000. Exempt yes 
Glenn SINGLE PERSON INELIGIBLE 
Humboldt 199.00 Loan Cash & 
Voucher 
Intent $ 50. 50. 1,500. Exempt yes 
Imperial 1.1 248.00 Loan Cash & 
Voucher 
Intent 100. 300. Exempt 
Inyo 8./ AS NEEDED Intent 
-0­
-0- -0­
-0­ ■ . " 
Kern 201.00 Loan Cash Intent yes 
-0­ -0- -0­
-0­
Kings 125.00 Loan Voucher Intent yes 1,000. -0­ Exempt yes 
Lake 5^/ 248.00 Loan Voucher Intent yes 50. 500. 500. Exempt yes 
Lassen 216.00 Loan Cash Intent 10./ 
yes 
600. 1,500. Exempt yes 
bd 
I 
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GENERAL RELIEF TELEPHONE QUESTIONNAIRE OF ALL COUNTY WELFARE DEPARTMENTS IN CALIFORNIA
 
LIMITS OF QUALIFICATION LIEN 
COUNTY ONE TYPE PAID BY RESIDENCY WORK CASH PERS. AUTO HOME ON 
PERSON REQUIREMENT PROG. PROP. HOME 
Los Angeles 228.00 Loan Cash & Intent yes 50. 500. 1,500. 34,000. yes 
Voucher Mkt.Value 
Madera 11./ Loan Cash 11./ reg. 500. 750. 20,000. yes 
163.00 EDD Mkt.Value 
Marin 186.00 Loan Cash Intent reg. 600. Exempt 14,000. yes 
EDD 
Mariposa 151.75 Loan Cash 12./ yes 600. 1,500. Assessed yes 
1-year 3,500. 
Mendocino 248.00 Loan Cash Intent 13./ 500. 1,500. Exempt yes 
yes 
Merced 198.00 Loan Cash Intent yes 1,500. 14./ Exempt yes 
Modoc 150.00 Grant Cash & Intent no 600. 1,500. Exempt no 
Voucher 
Mono 140.00 Grant Cash & 15./ CETA 150. 
-0­
-0­ no 
Voucher 1-year only 
Monterey 248.00 Loan Cash & Intent 16./ 500. 16. Exempt no 
Voucher yes 
w 
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GENERAL RELIEF TELEPHONE QUESTIONNAIRE OF ALL COUNTY WELFARE DEPARTMENTS IN CALIFORNIA
 
LIMITS OF QUALIFICATION LIEN
 
COUNTY ONE
 TYPE PAID BY
 RESIDENCY WORK CASH PERS. AUTO HOME
 ON
 
PERSON
 REQUIREMENT PROG. PROP.
 HOME
 
Napa 248.00 Grant Cash Intent 17./
 50. 500. 1,500. 17./ no
 
yes 5,000.
 
Nevada 225.00 Loan Voucher Intent 18./ 
yes 
50. 500. 1,000. 18./ 
14,000. 
yes 
Orange 240.00 Loan Cash Intent yes 50. 1,000. 19./ 
5,000. 
Placer 192.00 Loan Cash Intent yes 50. 1,500. Exempt not 
neces. 
Plumas 217.00 Loan Cash & 
Voucher 
Intent yes 500. 600. Exempt yes 
Riverside 191.00 Loan Voucher Intent yes 250. -0­ -0­
Sacramento 20.7 199.00 Loan Cash Intent yes 10. 1,500. 20,000. yes 
San Benito 173.00 Loan Voucher Intent yes 50. 1,000. 21./ 
10,000. 
yes 
San Bernardino 98.70 Grant Voucher Intent no 10. 250. 22./ 
5,000. 
no 
w 
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GENERAL RELIEF TELEPHONE QUESTIONNAIRE OF ALL COUNTY WELFARE DEPARTMENTS IN CALIFORNIA
 
LIMITS OF QUALIFICATION LIEN
COUNTY ONE
 TYPE PAID BY RESIDENCY WORK CASH PERS. AUTO HOME
 ON
 
PERSON
 REQUIREMENT PROG. PROP.
 HOME
 
San Diego 120.00 Loan Cash Intent yes 50. 500. Exempt yes 
San Francisco 
San Joaquin 
248.00 
142.00 
Grant 
Grant 
Cash & 
Voucher 
Voucher 
Intent 
Intent 
23./ 
yes 
yes 
25• Exempt 
600. 
Exempt 
1,500. 
Exempt 
Exempt 
no 
yes 
San Luis 24•/ 
Obisbo 
202.00 Grant Cash & 
Voucher 
Intent no 10. AFDC STANDARDS Exempt no 
San Mateo 248.00 Loan Cash Intent yes 50. 500. 25.1 yes 
2,500. 
Santa Barbara 26./ 
295.00 
Grant Cash 6t 
Voucher 
Intent yes 50. 800. Exempt no 
Santa Clara 215.00 27./ Cash Intent yes 150. 11.l Exempt yes 
Grant 1,000. 
Santa Cruz 248.00 Loan Voucher Intent yes 200. 28./ 25,000. yes 
1,500. 
Shasta 201.00 Loan Cash Intent yes 50. 200. 1,500. Exempt yes 
w 
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GENERAL RELIEF TELEPHONE QUESTIONNAIRE OF ALL COUNTY WELFARE DEPARTMENTS IN CALIFORNIA
 
LIMITS OF QUALIFICATION LIEN
COUNTY ONE
 TYPE PAID BY
 RESIDENCY WORK
 CASH PERS.
 AUTO HOME
 ON
PERSON
 REQUIREMENT PROG. PROP.
 HOME
 
Sierra AS NEEDED Cash Intent no 1,000. 600. 1,000. no 
Siskiyou 208.00 Loan Cash Intent 29./ 600. 1,000. Exempt yes 
Solano 248.00 Loan Cash Intent yes 25. 100. 750. 30.7 yes 
5,000. 
Sonoma 31./ 
227.50 
Loan Cash Intent yes 
-0­ 1,500. Exempt yes 
Stanislaus 240.00 Loan Cash Intent yes 300. 1,000. 20,000. yes 
Sutter 150.00 Loan Cash Intent yes 300. 1,000. 32./ yes 
1,000 
Tehama 33.7 
110.00 
Grant Cash & 
Voucher 
1-year 33./ no 600. 600. Exempt no 
Trinity AS NEEDED Cash i-year no 50. 200, 500. 2,000. no 
Tulare 215.00 Loan Cash Intent 34./ 34./ 1,500. Exempt yes 
yes 
w 
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NJ 
COUNTY
 
Tuolumrae
 
Ventura '
 
Yolo
 
Yuba
 
GENERAL RELIEF TELEPHONE QUESTIONNAIRE OF ALL COUNTY WELFARE DEPARTMENTS IN CALIFORNIA
 
LIMITS OF QUALIFICATION
 LIEN
 
ONE
 TYPE PAID BY RESIDENCY WORK
 CASH PERS. AUTO HOME
 ON
 
PERSON
 REQUIREMENT PROG. PROP. ;
 HOME
 
187.00 Loan	 Cash & l~year
 yes	 250. 1,500. Exempt yes
 
Voucher
 
201.00 Loan
 Voucher Intent
 yes 100. 1,000. 35./ Exempt yes
 
174.00 Loan	 Cash Intent yes
 300.	 1,500. 36./ no
 
5,000.
 
154.00 Loan	 Cash & Intent
 37./ 50. 300.
 37./ yes
 
Voucher ­ yes	 5,000.
 
I 
00 
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COUNTY NOTES
 
*/ Alameda - Plan to use lien on real property in near future.
 
2./ Butte - Recipients work 20 hours per week before receipt of
 
grant.
 
3»/ Calaveras - Relative responsible for repajnnent of grant.
 
^*/ Contra Costa — Auto and personal property combined in totdl*
 
3*/ ElDorado -

6>/ Humboldt -

7»/ Imperial -

Work program 	requires two days work per week.
 
Recipient sent to county work program after two
 
months on general relief.
 
Work off grant 	before it is given.
 
County has been subject of class-faction suit in
 
the recent past and has subsequently upgraded
 
their program. Currently, changes in AFDC will
 
cause changes in the general relief program.
 
8./ Inyo - Program is for residents only.
 
9./ Lake - This is a new program as of August 1982.
 
1Q»/ Lassen - Grant only given after it is worked off.
 
11*/ Madera -	There is no limit oti the amount of utilities that
 
will be paid, there is no residency requirement.
 
12./ Mariposa -	The county requires a one year residence in the
 
county before applicant is eligible for the general
 
relief program.
 
13./ Mendocino - Job search required of 6 places per week.
 
14*/ Merced -	Personal property limit includes the auto limit.
 
15./ Mono -	The county requires a one year residence in the county
 
before applicant is eligible for general relief.
 
16*/ Monterey -	Grant is to be worked off before it is given.
 
Auto limit is included in the personal property
 
, ■ limit. 
17*/ Napa -	Job program is not run by the county, recipient may
 
have $3,000. equity in a home.
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18>/ Nevada - Grant is given after it is worked off, home value 
is the assessed value of the home. 
19./ Grange - Home limit is at assessed valuation. 
20./ Sacramento -

21./ San Benito -

Even though these are the maximum limits for
 
general relief, the Bannon Street house run
 
by the Volunteers of America is the only
 
program of general relief currently in use for
 
the single adult or childless couples.
 
The county has a maximum grant of $175. for rent,
 
$62. for food, $6. for incidentals plus utilities
 
will be paid. Applicant must work off rent costs
 
before they are paid. Home limit is at assessed
 
valuation.
 
22./ San Bernardino - Home is at assessed value.
 
23./ San Francisco -	Work program is in connection with Glide
 
Foundation. Some social workers are sta
 
tioned at the Glide Foundation.
 
24*/ San Luis Obisbo -	I was told by Mr. Moore, of this county,
 
that the general relief program was a
 
"very complicated process."
 
25./ San Mateo -	Home valuation based on market value less encum
 
brances.
 
26./ Santa Barbara -	This county will give aid to those who are
 
verifiably living in their cars because
 
Santa Barbara has a very high occupancy
 
rate. Maximum grant consists of $195. for
 
rent, $7. for miscellaneous, $93. for gro
 
ceries, or $155. for restaurant food. There
 
is a downtown hotel available for some reci
 
pients.
 
27./ Santa Clara -	Work off before grant is given, car must be
 
5 years old or older.
 
28./ Santa Cruz - Auto 	limit is $500. above encumbrances.
 
29./ Siskiyou - Must 	register with FDD and do job search.
 
30./ Soloano - Home limit is at net value.
 
31./ Sonoma - Emergency aid can be given for up to three days.
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•! Sutter - Home limit is the equity in a home a recipient
 
may have.
 
21^/ Tehama -	Grant given plus utilities. Eligibility limited
 
to those who have one year residency in county
 
and 3 years in the state.
 
2^/ Tulare -	County work program pays $2.68 per hour. Per
 
sonal property limit is based on need.
 
22^/ Ventura — Auto limit is included in the personal pro
 
perty limit.
 
22i./ Yolo - Home limit is at net market value.
 
27_^/ Yuba -	In order to conduct a job search, a recipient must
 
contact 6 employers per week at the rate of 1 con
 
tact per day. Home limit is shown as $5,000 equity.
 
